



FEDERAL RESERVE BANK *of* NEW YORK

# Evolving Intermediation

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# Focus on financial intermediation

- Debate on size and complexity of financial sector really centered on financial intermediation
- Systemic externalities associated with financial intermediation activity well recognized
  - Maturity transformation and “run” risk
  - Liquidity transformation and shock amplification (e.g., fire sales)
  - Disruption in the provision of essential input (credit) in real economic activity

# Two current issues in financial intermediation

## 1. Costs and benefits of large and complex financial intermediaries

- Is there a “large” that is “too large”, or “too complex”?
- What does “large” even mean?
- Recovery and resolution
- International dimension. Identification of G-SIFIs. Additional supervisory scrutiny.

# Two current issues in financial intermediation

## 2. The rise and growth of shadow financial intermediation

- “Credit intermediation involving entities and activities outside the regular banking system.” (Financial Stability Board report)
- Who does intermediation?
- What is the role of regulated entities?
- Should we expand the boundaries of regulatory oversight?

# Implications of shadow financial intermediation


- Regulation itself may spur growth of shadow markets and activities
- If intermediation done outside of regulated entities, should we extend scope of government guarantees?
- Perfect tie with issue of size and complexity: What better definition of complexity of something that is even difficult to identify, let alone monitor and regulate?

# Evolution of banks and shadow banking

- How has financial intermediation evolved?
- Have banks – regulated intermediaries – adapted and remained central to the process of intermediation?
- To what extent has intermediation activity instead really moved in the shadow?

# Traditional model of intermediation

Banks are the main brokers in the process of credit intermediation




Intermediation activity on banks' balance sheet



# New model of intermediation. Two views.

1. Intermediation “technology” the same, but banks bypassed by new, unregulated entities




Banks lose centrality and become less relevant




# New model of intermediation. Two views.


2. Technology changes, new entities and markets emerge, but banks adapt



Banks remain an integral part in the new model of intermediation



# A more detailed view of the modern credit intermediation chain



Source: Shadow Banking (Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft, Boesky (2010))

Slide courtesy of Tobias Adrian

Very different implications depending on what is the “correct” view

- Differences in monitoring and regulatory approaches depending on whether:
  - Shadow banking starts and develops “independently”
  - Banks and shadow banks are intimately connected.

- Current regulatory options on the table refer to what already recognized as previously “in the shadow”
- Necessarily so: Regulation is subordinated to identification

# Forward-looking monitoring

- Are the monitoring and regulatory efforts in place suited to capture the dynamic evolution of modern intermediation?
- Much of future evolution itself the result of new monitoring and regulatory measures put in place to handle the recent past

# A contribution to this debate

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## ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW

SPECIAL ISSUE:  
THE EVOLUTION OF  
BANKS AND FINANCIAL  
INTERMEDIATION

**July 2012**

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2. *Regulation's Role in Bank Changes*  
Peter Olson
3. *The Rise of the Originate-to-Distribute Model and the Role of Banks in Financial Intermediation*  
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4. *The Role of Bank Credit Enhancements in Securitization*  
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7. *Heterogeneity among Larger Bank Holding Companies: 1994 to 2010*  
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
A new framework of analysis. Two-prongs approach

- 1. Role-based analysis.** Modern intermediation requires “new” roles along the intermediation chain. Who offers those roles?



# New map of financial intermediation

A **functional chain** in credit intermediation




Map morphologically equivalent to Poszar et al (2010). It stresses *roles / functions* rather than *steps / markets* along the chain.

## A new framework of analysis. Two-prongs approach

- 1. Role-based analysis.** Modern intermediation requires “new” roles along the intermediation chain. Who offers those roles?
- 2. Entity-based analysis.** Adaptation by banks through organizational changes: expand the boundaries of the banking firm. Incorporation of non-bank, specialized intermediaries under common ownership and control. Shift focus from *commercial bank* to *bank holding company*.


# Expansion of the boundaries of the banking firm




# The evidence

- Direct role. Banks are active participants in many of the steps of the credit intermediation chain.
- Indirect role: Banks are main providers of credit and liquidity support to shadow banks
- Organizational adaptation. Banks' organizational structure has indeed grown increasingly complex over the last twenty years. Increasing role played by non-bank subsidiaries


# Back to the map



# Dominant role of BHCs along the credit intermediation chain



# Dominant role of BHCs along the credit intermediation chain





# Organizational dynamics.

## Mergers and Acquisition, U.S. Financial Industry, 1982-2012

Buyer	Target									
	Asset Manager	Bank	Broker- Dealer	Fin Techn	Ins Broker	Ins Under writer	Inv Company	Savings Bank/ Thrift	Specialty Lender	
Asset Manager	401	0	23	57	17	14	4	2	50	568
Bank	390	7,802	162	146	744	20	1	2,340	830	12,435
Broker-Dealer	108	8	477	70	57	5	2	6	67	800
Financial Technology	9	1	17	841	55	5	0	1	22	951
Insurance Broker	30	0	9	31	1,626	23	0	1	4	1,724
Insurance Underwriter	90	5	30	104	490	1,180	0	10	55	1,964
Investment Company	17	1	2	5	4	2	11	1	64	107
Savings Bank/Thrift/M	41	581	28	5	141	6	0	1,330	217	2,349
Specialty Lender	6	17	15	26	11	5	3	19	937	1,039
	1,092	8,415	763	1,285	3,145	1,260	21	3,710	2,246	21,937

Substantial “off-diagonal” asset acquisition by banks

# BHCs organizational structure in 2012


## Number and Distribution of Subsidiaries: Selected Top 50 Bank Holding Companies

BHC rank	BHC Name	Number				Asset value	
		Domestic		Foreign	Total	Domestic	Consolidated Total
		Commercial bank	Other			Commercial bank (% of Y-9C Assets)	Assets (Y-9C) (in billions USD)
1	Jpmorgan Chase & Co.	4	2,936	451	3,391	86.1%	2,265.8
2	Bank Of America Corporation	5	1,541	473	2,019	77.9%	2,136.6
3	Citigroup Inc.	2	935	708	1,645	68.8%	1,873.9
4	Wells Fargo & Company	5	1,270	91	1,366	92.5%	1,313.9
5	Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., The	1	1,444	1,670	3,115	11.2%	923.7
6	Metlife, Inc.	1	39	123	163	3.2%	799.6
7	Morgan Stanley	2	1,593	1,289	2,884	10.5%	749.9
10	Bank Of New York Mellon Corporation, The	3	211	146	360	83.2%	325.8
20	Regions Financial Corporation	1	35	4	40	97.1%	127.0
30	Comerica Incorporated	2	72	2	76	99.8%	61.1
40	First Horizon National Corporation	1	35	1	37	99.1%	24.8
50	Webster Financial Corporation	1	21	0	22	99.8%	18.7
<b>Total</b>		86	13,670	5,847	19,603	70.4%	14,359.1

**Notes:** Structure data are as of February 20, 2012. Financial data are as of 2011Q4. The number of subsidiaries of each BHC is determined based on the Regulation Y definition of control. Asset data include approximately 3,700 of the more than 19,600 subsidiaries belonging to the top 50 BHCs that meet particular reporting threshold criteria.

**Avraham, Selvaggi and Vickery, EPR issue**

# Top U.S. Bank Holding Companies Number of subsidiaries 1990 vs 2012




**Notes:** Structure data are as of February 20, 2012, and December 31, 1990, and include the top 50 BHCs at each of these dates.

**Avraham, Selvaggi and Vickery, EPR issue**

# Increasing role of non-bank subsidiaries

Contribution of commercial bank subsidiaries to noninterest income of their BHCs



Copeland, EPR issue

# Summing up

- Modern system of financial intermediation is complex
- Many more entities other than banks involved (rise of “shadow banks”)
- Risks moved away from banks’ balance sheet
- Huge monitoring and regulatory implications
  - Expand regulatory umbrella outside of banking
  - Expand official “wrap”
  - Curb complexity

Bottom line: When looked closely, modern financial intermediation seems less “shadowy” than we thought

Regulated bank entities have kept a considerable footprint in modern financial intermediation.

How do we track *future* evolution?

Current regulatory option: expand perimeter of prudential supervision to what recognized as “in the shadow”

But new regulation may be a source of future shadow banking

Our analysis suggests if new products or activities emerge, there’s a very good chance a bank will be part of it.



# A tool for effective forward-looking monitoring

Intermediation has certainly grown complex, but the monitoring of banks can still provide an effective window into its continuous evolution, thus allowing for the identification of new risks and the design of prompt regulatory measures

Stress the role of bank supervisory agencies (focus on whole BHC structure) for effective forward-looking monitoring, before embarking in the possible creation of new regulatory bodies.

