From third world to first in class

从第三世界到第一名

2019/05/06 12:02
收藏
对照中文英文原文
乔纳森•沃策尔(Jonathan Woetzel)在《米尔肯研究所评论》(Milken Institute Review)中写道,快速的经济增长正在模糊发展中国家、新兴国家和发达国家之间的区别。

When historians in the distant future look back at our era, the name Alfred Sauvy may appear in a footnote somewhere. Sauvy was a French demographer who coined the term “third world” in a magazine article in 1952, just as the Cold War was heating up. His point was that there were countries not aligned with the United States or the Soviet Union that had pressing economic needs, but whose voices were not being heard.

当历史学家在遥远的将来回顾我们的时代时,艾尔弗雷德·苏维这个名字可能会出现在某个地方的脚注中。索维是一位法国人口学家,他在1952年的一篇杂志文章中创造了“第三世界”一词,当时冷战正在升温。他的观点是,有些与美国或苏联不一致的国家有迫切的经济需求,但他们的声音没有被听到。

Sauvy deliberately categorized these countries as inferior: “tiers monde” (or third world) was an explicit play on “tiers état” (third estate), the ragged assembly of peasants and bourgeoisie under France’s ancien régime that was subservient to the monarchy (the first estate) and the nobility (the second). “The third world is ignored, exploited and mistrusted, just like the third estate,” Sauvy wrote. “The millennial cycle of life and death has become a cycle of misery.”

索维故意将这些国家归类为劣等国家:“tier monde”(或第三世界)是对“tier etat”(第三等级)的一个明确的戏谑。“tier etat”是法国旧政权下农民和资产阶级衣衫褴褛的集会,隶属于君主政体(第一级)和贵族阶层(第二级)。“第三世界被忽视、剥削和不信任,就像第三阶层一样,”索维写道。“千禧一代的生与死循环已经变成了一个痛苦的循环。”

As a piece of editorial rhetoric based on the fetid geopolitical atmosphere of the time, Sauvy’s essay was on the mark. As prophecy about the course of economic progress, he could hardly have been more wrong.

作为一篇基于当时恶臭的地缘政治氛围的编辑辞令,苏维的文章可谓一针见血。作为对经济发展进程的预言,他大错特错。

“Third world” today is politically incorrect as a phrase and economically incorrect as a concept, for it fails to take into account one of the biggest stories of the past half-century: the spectacular economic development that has taken place across the globe. Since Sauvy’s essay, some (but not all) of the countries he referred to have enjoyed very rapid growth and huge leaps in living standards, including in health and education.

今天,“第三世界”作为一个短语在政治上是不正确的,作为一个概念在经济上也是不正确的,因为它没有考虑到过去半个世纪最大的故事之一:发生在全球各地的壮观的经济发展。自苏维的文章发表以来,他提到的一些国家(但不是所有国家)的经济增长非常迅速,生活水平大幅提高,包括健康和教育水平。

To cite just one metric: the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen from more than half the global population in the 1950s, when his magazine piece was published, to just over 10 percent today, even as the total population of the world has tripled.

仅举一个衡量标准:上世纪50年代,当他的那篇文章发表在杂志上时,全球生活在极端贫困中的人口占全球人口的一半以上,而如今,这一比例已降至略高于10%,尽管全球总人口已增长了两倍。

The changes have been so striking that we have reached a point where the very distinctions among “developing,” “emerging” and “advanced” countries have become blurred. Singapore is now the second most competitive economy in the world, according to the World Economic Forum’s 2018 Global Competitiveness Index, which also ranks Hong Kong, South Korea and Malaysia well ahead of Italy, a founding member of the G-7 club of “rich” countries. China has more billionaires than the United States and almost twice as many as the whole of Europe. Bombay’s stock exchange has a larger market capitalization than Frankfurt’s.

这些变化是如此引人注目,以至于我们已经到了这样一个地步:“发展中国家”、“新兴国家”和“发达国家”之间的差别已经变得模糊不清。根据世界经济论坛(world Economic Forum)发布的2018年全球竞争力指数(Global Competitiveness Index),新加坡目前是全球竞争力第二强的经济体。该指数还将香港、韩国和马来西亚排在“富裕”国家七国集团(G-7)创始成员国意大利之前。中国的亿万富翁人数超过美国,几乎是整个欧洲的两倍。孟买证券交易所的市值比法兰克福大。

Not all nations have progressed as rapidly, of course. Infant mortality and poverty, as well as overdependence on richer nations for humanitarian aid, remain topics of our age. Overall, however, emerging economies (as we’ll call them in this article, for lack of a better term) have become the motor of economic growth and consumption for the global economy.

当然,并非所有国家都取得了如此迅速的进展。婴儿死亡率和贫困,以及在人道主义援助方面对富裕国家的过度依赖,仍然是我们这个时代的主题。然而,总体而言,新兴经济体(我们将在本文中这样称呼它们,因为没有更好的术语)已经成为全球经济增长和消费的发动机。

Led by China and India, they accounted for almost two-thirds of the world’s GDP growth and more than half of new consumption over the past 15 years. Financial markets sometimes have jitters about emerging markets in the short term, and the current fear of trade wars is casting a shadow. But in the longer term, the McKinsey Global Institute estimates that their growth will continue and that, by 2030, these economies’ share of consumption will exceed half the global total.

在过去15年里,以中国和印度为首的新兴经济体占全球GDP增长的近三分之二,新增消费的一半以上。金融市场有时会在短期内对新兴市场感到不安,而目前对贸易战的担忧正在投下阴影。但麦肯锡全球研究所(McKinsey Global Institute)估计,从长远来看,这些经济体的增长将继续下去,到2030年,这些经济体的消费份额将超过全球总量的一半。

Far from being destined to live in misery, as Sauvy thought, the erstwhile third world has left the second world (the former Soviet bloc) behind in the dust and is racing to catch up to the first. Sauvy was also wrong about their voices not being heard. These days, the rising influence and commerce of China and others is a central topic in policy circles from Washington to Ouagadougou.

正如索维所认为的那样,昔日的第三世界远非注定要生活在悲惨之中,而是将第二世界(前苏联集团)抛在了身后,正竞相追赶第一世界。索维也错在他们的声音没有被听到。如今,从华盛顿到瓦加杜古,中国和其他国家日益增长的影响力和商业活动,已成为政策圈的中心话题。

Who Wins, Who Loses?

谁赢谁输?

This turn of fortune raises some important questions. First, how did these countries do it? Second, can they maintain their trajectory and pace of growth in an age of technological ferment and at a time when the nature of globalization itself is shifting? And third, what does the rise of emerging economies mean for policymakers, business leaders and investors (along with everybody else) around the world?

这种命运的转变带来了一些重要的问题。首先,这些国家是如何做到的?第二,在这个技术动荡的时代,在全球化本身的性质正在发生变化的时代,它们能否保持自己的发展轨迹和速度?第三,新兴经济体的崛起对全球政策制定者、商界领袖和投资者(以及其他所有人)意味着什么?

Lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and into the consuming class is an incredible feat for humanity. And it has proved a boon to savvy investors. But it has also had unintended consequences on incomes and employment in some parts of the first world. That in turn has sparked a political back-lash, as disaffected populations take to the streets, donning yellow vests to burn cars and smash stores, or to elect leaders who rail against trade and immigration. Is the next phase of globalization destined to be a zero-sum game in which their good fortune is mirrored by our loss?

让数亿人摆脱贫困,进入消费阶层,对人类来说是一项不可思议的壮举。事实证明,这对精明的投资者来说是件好事。但它也对第一世界某些地区的收入和就业产生了意想不到的影响。这进而引发了政治上的反弹,不满的民众走上街头,身穿黄色马甲焚烧汽车、砸烂商店,或者选举出反对贸易和移民的领导人。全球化的下一个阶段注定是一场零和游戏吗?

The Scorecard

记分卡

Not all developing countries are equal in terms of growth over the past half-century. While much effort has been devoted to determining the prerequisites for development, economists continue to probe why incomes have so widely diverged. To put it succinctly, what is the secret sauce that make some countries develop faster than others?

在过去的半个世纪里,并不是所有的发展中国家在经济增长方面都是平等的。尽管在确定发展的先决条件方面投入了大量努力,但经济学家们仍在探索收入差距如此之大的原因。简而言之,是什么让一些国家比其他国家发展得更快?

In our research, we looked at the record of 71 developing economies since 1965 to identify those that grew faster and more sustainably than their peers. In all, we found 18 countries that outperformed — and quite a few others that could follow suit.

在我们的研究中,我们查看了自1965年以来71个发展中经济体的记录,以找出那些增长速度更快、更可持续的经济体。我们发现,总共有18个国家的表现优于美国,还有相当多的国家可能效仿。

Seven economies achieved or exceeded real annual per capita GDP growth of 3.5 percent for the entire 50-year period. This threshold is the average growth rate required by low- and lower-middle-income economies to achieve upper-middle-income status (currently about $4,000 per capita per year, as defined by the World Bank) in a half-century. The seven are not exactly a big surprise. They are all Asian (China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand), and their rise has been the subject of countless studies over the past two decades.

五十年来,7个经济体实现或超过人均国内生产总值3.5%的实际增长。这一阈值是低收入和低收入经济体在半个世纪内达到中上收入水平(根据世界银行的定义,目前人均年收入约为4000美元)所需的平均增长率。这七件事并不令人意外。他们都是亚洲人(中国、香港、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、新加坡、韩国和泰国),在过去20年里,他们的崛起一直是无数研究的主题。

The 11 other outperformers are less heralded. These more recently successful and more geographically diverse countries range across income levels: Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cambodia, Ethiopia, India, Kazakhstan, Laos, Myanmar, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. They all achieved real average annual per capita GDP growth of at least 5 percent between 1995 and 2016 — in other words, stronger growth but for a shorter period than the original seven. That 5 percent growth, 3.5 percentage points above the per capita GDP growth rate of the United States, was enough to lift them by one income bracket (low to lower-middle or lower-middle to upper-middle) as defined by the World Bank.

其他11位表现优异的公司则没有那么出名。这些最近更成功、地理上更多样化的国家的收入水平也各不相同:阿塞拜疆、白俄罗斯、柬埔寨、埃塞俄比亚、印度、哈萨克斯坦、老挝、缅甸、土库曼斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦和越南。从1995年到2016年,他们都实现了人均国内生产总值的实际年均增长至少5%——换句话说,增长更强劲,但比最初的7个国家增长的时间更短。这5%的增长,比美国人均GDP增长率高出3.5个百分点,足以使他们的收入水平提高一个世界银行定义的收入等级(从低到中下或从中下到中上)。

Most of these 18 countries have endured short-term volatility from time to time. But they have shown themselves to be resilient, exceeding the benchmark growth rate in at least three-fourths of the 50- and 20-year periods. Some countries, among them Brazil, Ghana and Poland, didn’t make the cut because their growth was unacceptably volatile, but our 18 outperformers managed to bounce back from setbacks speedily and become more stable.

在这18个国家中,大多数国家不时经历短期波动。但它们已显示出自己的韧性,在50年和20年的经济周期中,至少有四分之三的时间超过了基准增长率。包括巴西、加纳和波兰在内的一些国家未能上榜,因为它们的增长波动大得令人无法接受,但我们的18个表现优异的国家成功地从挫折中迅速反弹,变得更加稳定。

For example, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand were all hit by the 1997 Asian crisis but recovered to positive GDP per capita growth within a year or two. They learned the lessons of the dangers of foreign currency debt and inadequate foreign exchange reserves, which prepared them to withstand the 2008 global financial crisis reasonably well. That is not to say they are immune to shocks; rather, their track records suggest that they are better able to deal with them than many of their peers.

例如,印度尼西亚、马来西亚、韩国和泰国都受到了1997年亚洲金融危机的冲击,但在一两年内恢复到人均GDP的正增长。他们从外币债务和外汇储备不足的危险中吸取了教训,这使他们能够相当好地抵御2008年的全球金融危机。这并不是说他们对冲击免疫;相反,他们的过往记录表明,他们比许多同龄人更能处理这些问题。

Recipe for the Secret Sauce

秘制酱料的配方

When we deconstructed the secret sauce, we found two essential ingredients. First, these countries implemented policies that, while varying in detail, shared some common characteristics that we define as a pro-growth agenda of stimulating productivity, income and demand. Those agendas included, for example:

当我们解构这个秘密酱料时,我们发现了两种基本成分。首先,这些国家实施的政策虽然在细节上有所不同,但有一些共同的特点,我们将其定义为促进增长的议程,即刺激生产力、收入和需求。这些议程包括:

  • steps to increase capital accumulation, such as mandates for retirement saving
  • 增加资本积累的步骤,如强制退休储蓄
  • efforts to boost government effectiveness
  • 加强政府效能建设
  • measures to encourage more competition in the domestic market
  • 鼓励国内市场竞争的措施

Successful countries implemented policies with pro-growth agendas of productivity, growth and demand

成功的国家实施了促进增长的生产力、增长和需求议程的政策

Capital accumulation contributed an average of 3.7 percentage points to the aggregate growth rate of the 50-year outperformers on our list and 5.1 percentage points to recent outperformers’ growth — which is substantially more than in the economies of both peer emerging economies and high-income countries, where capital accumulation accounted for about 1.7 percentage points of real GDP growth.

资本积累的贡献平均3.7的总增长率50年业绩优胜者名单上最近的业绩优胜者和5.1的经济增长——这是大大超过同行新兴经济体和高收入国家,在资本积累约占实际GDP增长的1.7。

The productivity gains, generally linked to capital accumulation and honest, more efficient governance, are striking: more than two-thirds of the GDP growth in the outperforming countries over the past 30 years is attributable to a rapid rise in productivity that’s generally correlated with industrialization. These countries achieved annual average productivity growth of 4.1 percent, compared with just 0.8 percent for economies that have yet to reach “emerging” status.

生产率的提高,通常与资本积累和诚实、更有效的治理有关,令人瞩目:在过去30年表现优异的国家,超过三分之二的GDP增长归因于生产率的快速增长,而生产率的快速增长通常与工业化有关。这些国家实现了4.1%的年平均生产率增长,而那些尚未达到“新兴”经济体的年平均生产率增幅仅为0.8%。

When we decomposed total productivity growth in the most successful economies from 1965 to 2012 across 35 sectors (15 manufacturing sectors and 20 service sectors), we found that long-term growth was overwhelmingly driven by productivity growth within individual sectors rather than from the mix across sectors. In other words, success depended less on finding the right mix of sectors than on identifying sources of competitive advantage — and continuously driving productivity improvements within those sectors.

当我们将1965年至2012年最成功经济体35个部门(15个制造业部门和20个服务业)的总生产率增长分解后,我们发现,长期增长绝大多数是由单个部门的生产率增长驱动的,而不是来自各个部门的混合增长。换句话说,成功与其说取决于找到正确的行业组合,不如说是取决于确定竞争优势的来源——并不断推动这些行业的生产率提高。

Competition is a key here. One of the essential ingredients we identified was the strong competitive dynamics within many of the outperforming economies, which enabled the rise of a generation of large companies that have driven productivity and GDP growth. These companies have been less studied in emerging economies than the policy measures that drove growth.

竞争是关键。我们确定的一个重要因素是许多表现优异的经济体内部强大的竞争动力,这使得推动生产率和GDP增长的新一代大公司得以崛起。新兴经济体对这些公司的研究,要少于推动增长的政策措施。

However, our analysis highlighted their often-underappreciated role: adjusted for the relative size of the economies, the 18 outperformers have twice as many publicly listed companies with annual revenues exceeding $500 million as other growth contenders. Small and medium-sized enterprises are often given pride of place in development theory, but we find that large enterprises are in fact the common denominator for the 18.

然而,我们的分析强调了它们经常被低估的作用:根据经济的相对规模进行调整后,18家表现优异的上市公司的年营收超过5亿美元的数量是其他成长型竞争者的两倍。中小企业往往在发展理论中占有重要地位,但我们发现,大企业实际上是18个发展理论的公分母。

Here, the ratio of large-corporation revenue to GDP almost tripled in just 20 years, from 22 percent in 1995 to 64 percent in 2016 — far higher than the ratio in slower-growth peers and approaching high-income-country levels. Over the same period, the contribution of large-corporation value added to GDP also rose sharply, from 11 percent to 27 percent.

在这里,大公司收入占GDP的比例在短短20年内几乎增长了两倍,从1995年的22%增长到2016年的64%,远远高于增长较慢的同行,接近高收入国家的水平。同期,大企业增加值对国内生产总值的贡献率也大幅上升,从11%提高到27%。

Governments in the outperformers worked with the private sector to define the development agenda, and they actively cleared the way for growth with business-friendly regulatory flexibility. The firms that come out of this environment are battle-hardened — they have often survived tough knocks at home — which helps explain why they are making inroads in global markets so rapidly against U.S. and European incumbents.

表现优异的国家的政府与私营部门合作确定了发展议程,并以有利于企业的监管灵活性积极为增长扫清道路。走出这种环境的公司都是久经沙场的公司——它们往往在国内经受住了严峻的打击——这有助于解释它们为何如此迅速地在全球市场上与美国和欧洲的老牌公司展开竞争。

Bigger is Better

越大越好

Big businesses in emerging economies now play a disproportionately large role on the global stage. While they accounted for only about 25 percent of the total revenue and net income of all large public companies globally in 2016, they contributed about 40 percent of the revenue growth and net income growth from 2005 to 2016. More than 120 of these companies have joined the Fortune Global 500 list since 2000.

新兴经济体的大企业如今在全球舞台上扮演着不成比例的重要角色。尽管2016年它们仅占全球所有大型上市公司总收入和净利润的25%左右,但它们对2005年至2016年全球收入增长和净利润增长的贡献约为40%。自2000年以来,已有120多家公司进入《财富》全球500强。

When we examined the track record of these companies more closely, we found that more than half that reached the top quintile in terms of generating profits between 2001 and 2005 had been kicked off their perch within a decade. That’s a high churn rate, reflecting the difficulty of reaching the top and constructing barriers against newcomers. By comparison, 62 percent of incumbents in high-income economies, on average, remained in the top quintile for the same decade. In the United States, 68 percent stayed put, and in the United Kingdom, the figure was 76 percent.

当我们更仔细地研究这些公司的业绩记录时,我们发现,在2001年至2005年期间,在创造利润方面达到前五分之一的公司中,有一半以上在10年内被踢出了这个位置。这是一个高流失率,反映了达到顶峰的难度和对新来者设置障碍的难度。相比之下,高收入经济体中,62%的在职者在相同的十年里平均保持在前五分之一。在美国,68%的人留在原地,而在英国,这个数字是76%。

One of the biggest surprises came from a survey we conducted of companies in seven economies, both emerging and advanced. It showed just how competitive these emerging economies have become. The top performers innovate more aggressively than their advanced-economy rivals: 56 percent of their revenue comes from new products and services, compared with 48 percent for firms in advanced economies. These firms also invest almost twice as much as their advanced-economy peers, when measured as the ratio of capital spending to depreciation. And they are nimbler as they do so: on average, they make important investment decisions six to eight weeks faster, which amounts to 30-40 percent less time.

最大的意外之一来自我们对7个经济体(新兴经济体和发达经济体)的企业进行的一项调查。这显示出这些新兴经济体已经变得多么有竞争力。表现最好的企业比其发达经济体的竞争对手更积极地创新:56%的收入来自新产品和服务,而发达经济体的这一比例为48%。如果以资本支出与折旧之比来衡量,这些公司的投资额几乎是发达经济体的两倍。同时,他们也更加灵活:平均而言,他们做出重要投资决策的速度要快6至8周,这相当于少了30%至40%的时间。

These firms can also be good investments, as we discuss in more detail below. Between 2014 and 2016, the top quartile of companies in the best-performing economies generated a total average return to shareholders of 23 percent, compared with 15 percent for top-quartile firms in high-income countries.

这些公司也可以是很好的投资,我们将在下面详细讨论。2014年至2016年,在表现最好的经济体中,排名前四分之一的公司股东平均总回报率为23%,而在高收入国家,排名前四分之一的公司股东平均总回报率为15%。

Some readers may by now be complaining, as some in Washington and other capitals do, that the competitive edge we are seeing in these countries and companies has been unfairly gained. It is indeed true that some governments do support young companies in various ways, with the goal of helping them grow. However, our research also found that where governments aid up-and-comers, the support is generally targeted and time-bound. The broader aim, it seems, is to make companies, and the economy overall, more competitive — not to nurture powerful interests seeking rents. Countries where support was given but productivity growth stagnated did not achieve sustainable growth.

一些读者可能会像华盛顿和其他国家的一些人一样,抱怨我们在这些国家和企业中看到的竞争优势是不公平获得的。的确,一些政府确实以各种方式支持年轻的公司,目的是帮助它们成长。然而,我们的研究也发现,政府对后起之先的援助通常是有针对性和时限的。更广泛的目标似乎是让企业和整体经济更具竞争力,而不是培养强大的寻租利益集团。提供了支持但生产率增长停滞的国家没有实现可持续增长。

The Times They Are A Changin'

他们正在改变的时代

Could what we once knew as the third world end up at the top of the heap? Will the strong growth trajectory we have seen among outperforming economies continue? And what about other emerging economies that are poised to break into the ranks of out-performers?

我们曾经所知的第三世界最终会成为世界经济的中心吗?我们在表现优异的经济体中看到的强劲增长轨迹还会继续吗?那么,其他准备跻身表现优异者行列的新兴经济体呢?

In our research, we identified several countries that have adopted significant elements of the pro-growth agenda as well as spawning a new generation of firms that are global competitors. Some, including Bangladesh, Bolivia, the Philippines and Rwanda, are already achieving per-capita growth that exceeds 3.5 percent over a period of several years. Others, including Kenya, Mozambique, Paraguay, Senegal and Tanzania, are posting significant improvements in key productivity, income and demand drivers, although their per capita growth rate has not yet reached a consistent 3.5 percent. Two other countries, Côte d’Ivoire and the Dominican Republic, have hit the growth target, but lag on some of the policy elements.

在我们的研究中,我们确定了几个国家已经采纳了促进增长议程的重要内容,并孕育了新一代的公司,它们是全球竞争对手。包括孟加拉国、玻利维亚、菲律宾和卢旺达在内的一些国家已经在几年的时间里实现了超过3.5%的人均增长。其他国家,包括肯尼亚、莫桑比克、巴拉圭、塞内加尔和坦桑尼亚,在关键的生产力、收入和需求驱动方面都取得了显著的进步,尽管它们的人均增长率还没有达到3.5%。另外两个国家,科特迪瓦和多米尼加共和国,已经达到了增长目标,但在一些政策因素上落后。

We also found that if all the emerging economies we looked at were able to match the productivity growth performance of the ones we tagged as outperformers, the boost to global GDP growth by 2030 would amount to $11 trillion — the equivalent of adding another China. That aspirational scenario would also lift another 200 million people out of poverty.

我们还发现,如果我们所考察的所有新兴经济体的生产率增长都能与我们所认定的表现出众的经济体相媲美,那么到2030年,全球GDP增长将达到11万亿美元——相当于再增加一个中国。这一雄心勃勃的设想还将使另外2亿人摆脱贫困。

The broader aim with government support for growth has been to make young companies, and the economy overall, more competitive.

政府支持经济增长的更广泛目标是让年轻企业和整体经济更具竞争力。

Yet, to paraphrase the mutual fund ads, past performance is not a reliable guide for future growth. Four seismic shifts are currently taking place in the global economy that seem poised to change conditions for all economies, emerging and advanced alike, and what worked for emerging economies in 1990 may not work today. Conversely, new opportunities beckon, putting a premium on agility and adaptability, not just at the firm level, but also at the level of national economies. The four shifts are

然而,套用共同基金广告的说法,过去的业绩并不是未来增长的可靠指引。全球经济目前正在发生四次巨大的变化,这些变化似乎将改变所有经济体的状况,无论是新兴经济体还是发达经济体,而1990年对新兴经济体起作用的做法,今天可能已经不管用了。相反,新的机会正在召唤,不仅在公司一级,而且在国家经济一级,都重视灵活性和适应性。四班制是

  • the rapid march of technological progress
  • 技术进步的快速进步
  • the emerging “superstar” phenomenon, which is exacerbating inequalities
  • 新兴的“超级明星”现象,加剧了不平等
  • the rapidly changing dynamics of China’s economy
  • 中国经济快速变化的动力
  • the evolving nature of globalization itself.
  • 全球化本身的演变性质。

Technological progress. First, the technological shifts. Smartphones, the mobile internet, e-commerce and cloud-based services are now ubiquitous — and have opened the door to more mobility and convenience globally, as well as to greater competition. Moreover, it’s not all happening in Silicon Valley. India alone has more than half a billion Internet subscribers, and Indians downloaded 12 billion apps in 2018. Kenya has taken a global lead in providing financial services to the poor and unbanked, thanks to some fast footwork by a telecom company whose technology enables digital payments by phone. China’s Tencent and Alibaba are blazing trails in digital services and e-commerce.

技术进步。首先,技术变革。智能手机、移动互联网、电子商务和基于云的服务如今无处不在,它们为全球更大的机动性和便利性以及更激烈的竞争打开了大门。此外,这并非都发生在硅谷。仅印度就有超过5亿互联网用户,2018年印度人下载了120亿应用程序。肯尼亚在向穷人和无银行账户的人提供金融服务方面处于全球领先地位,这要归功于一家电信公司的快速步伐,该公司的技术支持通过电话进行数字支付。中国的腾讯(Tencent)和阿里巴巴(Alibaba)在数字服务和电子商务领域都走在了前列。

Now comes the next wave of innovation in the form of advanced automation and artificial intelligence. An explosion in algorithmic capabilities, computing capacity and data volume is enabling beyond-human machine competencies and a new generation of system-level innovation.

现在,以先进自动化和人工智能的形式出现了下一波创新浪潮。算法能力、计算能力和数据量的爆炸式增长,使得超越人类机器能力和新一代系统级创新成为可能。

These technologies still have limitations, and deployment can be complex. Nonetheless, massive productivity gains across sectors are already visible, with AI in functions such as sales and marketing (e.g., “next product to buy” personalization), supply chain logistics, and preventive maintenance.

这些技术仍然有局限性,部署可能很复杂。尽管如此,随着人工智能在销售和营销(例如“下一个要购买的产品”个性化)、供应链物流和预防性维护等功能上的应用,各行业的生产率大幅提高已经显而易见。

It's no surprise to find that companies from China, India, Japan and South Korea have made the biggest gains.

毫无疑问,来自中国、印度、日本和韩国的公司收益最大。

For the global economy, AI adoption could be a boon. A simulation we conducted showed that AI could raise global GDP by as much as $13 trillion by 2030, which translates to an additional 1.2 percent GDP growth per year.

对全球经济而言,人工智能的采用可能是件好事。我们进行的一项模拟显示,到2030年,人工智能可以使全球GDP增加多达13万亿美元,相当于每年GDP增长1.2%。

For now, China and the United States are responsible for the most AI-related research activities and investment, with Europe coming a distant third. India may not be far behind. It produces around 1.7 million graduates a year with STEM degrees — more than the total number of STEM graduates produced by all G-7 countries.

目前,与人工智能相关的研究活动和投资最多的是中国和美国,欧洲远远排在第三位。印度或许也不远了。它每年培养大约170万名拥有STEM学位的毕业生,超过了七国集团所有国家的STEM毕业生总数。

The "superstar" phenomenon. As disproportionately large rewards go to the winners, those falling behind face disproportionately large losses. The net effect of this phenomenon, which can be found not only in companies, but in sectors and even cities, is an increasingly uneven distribution of wealth and income that could in turn create negative feedback loops.

“超级明星”现象。由于不成比例的巨额奖金流向了赢家,那些落后的企业将面临不成比例的巨额亏损。这一现象的净效应不仅体现在企业中,还体现在行业乃至城市中,那就是财富和收入的分配日益不均,进而可能产生负反馈循环。

Our analysis of nearly 6,000 of the world’s largest public and private firms shows that the top 10 percent — the superstars — capture 80 percent of profits. These aren’t just the first-world incumbents of yore; they come from all sectors of the global economy and all regions. Indeed, their geographic diversity has increased over the past 20 years.

我们对全球近6000家最大的公共和私营企业进行的分析显示,前10%的超级明星攫取了80%的利润。他们不仅是昔日第一世界的现任者;他们来自全球经济的各个领域和各个地区。事实上,它们的地理多样性在过去20年里有所增加。

U.S. and Chinese tech companies that didn’t exist 20 years ago — among them Alibaba, Facebook and Tencent — are on the list alongside old-school brands such as Coca-Cola and Nestlé. American companies account for 38 percent of these leaders, down from 45 percent in the 1990s but still the largest contingent. It’s no surprise to find that companies from China, India, Japan and South Korea have made the biggest gains and now account for 22 percent of the total, up from 7 percent in the 1990s.

20年前还不存在的美国和中国科技公司——包括阿里巴巴、Facebook和腾讯——与可口可乐(Coca-Cola)和雀巢(Nestle)等老牌品牌一起榜上有名。在这些领导者中,美国公司占38%,低于上世纪90年代的45%,但仍是最大的一支。毫无疑问,来自中国、印度、日本和韩国的公司取得了最大的收益,目前占总收益的22%,高于上世纪90年代的7%。

These top-decile firms capture 1.6 times more economic profit today compared to 20 years ago, with larger revenues and higher profit margins than in the past. By contrast, the bottom decile destroys more value (i.e., loses more money) than the top 10 percent creates.

与20年前相比,这些排名前十的公司如今的经济利润增长了1.6倍,收入和利润率也比过去更高。相比之下,底部十分位则破坏了更多的值(即。)比最富有的10%所创造的还要多。

The skew is greater still when looking at the top 1 percent. The world’s 58 largest value-creating firms account for 6 percent of all economic profit. They have 20 times more sales, 4 times more profit (based on net income margin) and 5 times more R&D investment than the median for firms with annual sales above $1 billion.

当看到最顶端的1%时,这种偏差更大。世界上最大的58家创造价值的公司占所有经济利润的6%。他们的销售额是那些年销售额超过10亿美元的公司的20倍,利润是那些年净利润的4倍,研发投资是那些年销售额超过10亿美元的公司的5倍。

China’s growing economy. The third seismic shift we see is taking place in China, and in its relationship with the world. By 2017, China accounted for 15 percent of world GDP. According to the IMF, it overtook the United States to become the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power in 2014. (In terms of GDP at current exchange rates, China’s economy is still just two-thirds the size of the U.S. economy.)

中国的经济增长。我们看到的第三次巨变发生在中国,以及中国与世界的关系上。到2017年,中国占世界GDP的15%。根据国际货币基金组织(IMF)的数据,中国在2014年超过美国,成为全球购买力最大的经济体。(按当前汇率计算,中国经济规模仅为美国的三分之二。)

Behind these headline numbers lies a less-noticed shift: over the past decade, even as its economy has grown, China’s exposure to the world, as measured by the magnitude of flows of trade, technology and capital relative to its GDP, has declined. At the same time, the world’s exposure to China has increased. For the first time in history, emerging economies contribute more than half of global trade flows, with trade between China and other developing countries being the fastest-growing component.

在这些总体数据背后,隐藏着一个不那么引人注目的转变:过去10年,尽管中国经济有所增长,但以贸易、技术和资本相对于GDP的流动规模来衡量,中国对世界的敞口却在下降。与此同时,世界对中国的敞口也在增加。新兴经济体对全球贸易流量的贡献有史以来首次超过一半,其中中国与其他发展中国家之间的贸易增长最快。

South-south trade (trade that doesn’t involve traditional first-world economies) has risen from 8 percent of global trade in 1995 to 20 percent in 2016. By contrast, north-north trade (trade among high-income economies) has dropped from 55 percent of the total in 1995 to 33 percent today. If this trend continues, other emerging markets could benefit from increased investment and increased transfer of know-how from China — and China could become an increasingly important destination for their labor-intensive imports.

南南贸易(不涉及传统第一世界经济体的贸易)占全球贸易的比例从1995年的8%上升到2016年的20%。相比之下,南北贸易(高收入经济体之间的贸易)从1995年的55%下降到今天的33%。如果这一趋势继续下去,其它新兴市场可能会从中国增加的投资和技术转移中受益——中国可能会成为它们劳动密集型进口产品的一个日益重要的目的地。

Globalization’s evolution. The fourth shift is in part related to the first three: globalization itself is morphing, becoming more data- and services-driven even as global value chains are shifting along with the balance of power. Long global supply chains are starting to make way for shorter, localized production of goods near consumer markets. China and other developing countries are consuming more of what they produce and exporting a smaller share.

全球化的发展。第四次转变在一定程度上与前三次有关:全球化本身正在发生变化,越来越多的数据和服务驱动着全球化,尽管全球价值链正随着实力平衡发生变化。较长的全球供应链正开始为消费品市场附近较短的本地化生产让路。中国和其他发展中国家消费的产品越来越多,而出口所占份额却越来越小。

As emerging economies build more comprehensive domestic supply chains, they are reducing their reliance on imported intermediate inputs. One consequence is that goods-producing value chains have become less trade-intensive, even as cross-border services are growing briskly and generating more economic value than trade statistics capture.

随着新兴经济体建立更全面的国内供应链,它们正在减少对进口中间投入的依赖。一个结果是,尽管跨境服务增长迅速,创造的经济价值超过贸易统计数据,但商品生产价值链的贸易密集程度已经降低。

Trade based on labor costs has been declining and now makes up only 20 percent of goods trade. Some of these shifts are not yet captured in trade statistics, since these do not track soaring cross-border flows of free digital services, including email, real-time mapping and social media. Indeed, even as trade in physical goods and cross-border financial flows lost momentum following the 2008 global financial crisis, data flows have risen sharply and are helping to drive global GDP.

基于劳动力成本的贸易一直在下降,目前仅占商品贸易的20%。其中一些变化还没有体现在贸易统计数据中,因为这些数据没有追踪到电子邮件、实时地图和社交媒体等免费数字服务不断飙升的跨境流动。事实上,尽管2008年全球金融危机之后,实物贸易和跨境金融流动失去了势头,但数据流动却大幅上升,并在一定程度上推动了全球GDP的增长。

Cross-border data volume grew by 148 times between 2005 and 2017, to more than 700 terabytes per second (the entire U.S. Library of Congress contains less than 700 terabytes of data), and are projected to grow another nine-fold in the next five years as digital flows supporting commerce, video, search and communications continue to surge.

跨境数据量增长了148倍,从2005年到2017年,超过700字节每秒(整个美国国会图书馆包含不超过700 tb的数据),并预计将增长9倍在未来五年数字流支持商业、视频、搜索和通信继续飙升。

Through a Glass Darkly

透过黑暗的玻璃

How will these shifts play out? You don’t need superpowers to figure out that the changes outlined above are long-term ones. Their effects will be profound even if, as yet, they are not entirely clear.

这些转变将如何实现?你不需要超级大国来搞清楚上述变化是长期的。它们的影响将是深远的,尽管目前还不完全清楚。

From a political standpoint, we can already see repercussions, as Washington reconfigures its rhetoric and relationships with the rest of the world, starting with China. In Europe, Brexit and the yellow vests in France are both manifestations of public disgruntlement with how the world is changing.

从政治角度看,我们已经看到了影响,因为华盛顿正在调整其措辞,并开始调整与世界其他国家的关系,从中国开始。在欧洲,英国退欧和法国的黄色背心都是公众对世界变化不满的表现。

Should we expect another “Thucydides Trap” — the prospect that when one great power threatens to displace another, war is almost always the result? Harvard’s Graham Allison, for one, thinks that can be avoided. Whatever the new geopolitical tensions that may arise, all countries in the erstwhile first world will need to adjust to the shifting power balance. Their big challenge will be to rekindle growth as they do so.

我们是否应该期待另一个“修昔底德陷阱”——即当一个大国威胁要取代另一个大国时,战争几乎总是结果?哈佛大学的格雷厄姆•艾利森(Graham Allison)就是其中之一,他认为这是可以避免的。无论可能出现何种新的地缘政治紧张局势,昔日第一世界的所有国家都将需要适应不断变化的权力平衡。他们面临的最大挑战将是在此过程中重振增长。

One thing is certain: the cycle of misery Sauvy predicted back in 1952 was spectacularly off the mark.

有一件事是肯定的:索维早在1952年就预言了痛苦的循环,但这一预测却大错特错。

Normally, they would be the ones to adopt automation and AI faster since their labor costs are higher, and thus be quicker to reap the productivity gains from adoption. But public fears of job losses could slow that adoption. And, as we have seen, productivity growth has stalled in advanced economies, even as China has become a formidable innovation machine that is already a leader in AI research.

通常,他们会更快地采用自动化和人工智能,因为他们的劳动力成本更高,从而更快地从采用中获得生产率收益。但公众对失业的担忧可能会减缓这一进程。正如我们所看到的,发达经济体的生产率增长已陷入停滞,尽管中国已成为强大的创新机器,在人工智能研究方面已处于领先地位。

For companies, global competition seems sure to become more intense as emerging-economy firms make deeper inroads into markets everywhere, not just at home. This could lead to a plethora of protectionist measures and increased complexity in supply chains. But the shifting value chains will create new opportunities. As noted, one of our main findings is that cross-border services are growing considerably faster than cross-border trade of physical goods. Automation could enable many companies to bring production closer to their key markets.

对于企业来说,随着新兴经济体企业不仅在国内市场,而且在世界各地的市场都取得了更大的进展,全球竞争似乎肯定会变得更加激烈。这可能导致过多的保护主义措施,并增加供应链的复杂性。但不断变化的价值链将创造新的机遇。如前所述,我们的主要发现之一是,跨境服务的增长速度远远快于跨境实物贸易。自动化可以使许多公司使生产更接近其关键市场。

Still, low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing does seem to have a future: China itself is outsourcing such manufacturing as it moves to more R&D-intensive production. In many outperformers, there is plenty of room for manufacturing to grow, both in terms of value-added share and employment.

尽管如此,低成本、劳动密集型的制造业似乎仍有未来:随着中国转向研发密集型生产,中国本身也在外包此类制造业。在许多表现优异的企业中,无论是在附加值份额还是就业方面,制造业都有很大的增长空间。

For investors, these are interesting times. When emerging economies embrace pro-growth policies, we see that certain businesses benefit disproportionately — typically, those operating in sectors that are most open to international trade and can achieve minimum efficient scale rapidly. Size matters, because large, publicly listed firms in outperforming emerging economies increased their net income four to five percentage points faster annually than firms in other emerging economies from 1995 to 2016.

对投资者来说,这是一个有趣的时期。当新兴经济体采取促进增长的政策时,我们看到某些企业获得了不成比例的好处——通常是那些在对国际贸易最开放、能够迅速实现最低效率规模的行业经营的企业。规模很重要,因为从1995年到2016年,表现优于新兴经济体的大型上市公司的净利润增速比其他新兴经济体的公司快4至5个百分点。

At the same time, the increased churn and dynamism among top emerging-economy companies makes picking winners especially difficult. Investors may want to use both a telescope and a microscope — a telescope to search broadly for economies with pro-growth agendas and the industries that will benefit, and a microscope to look narrowly for companies with the winning attributes that can benefit disproportionately from economic growth.

与此同时,顶尖新兴经济体企业的流动性和活力不断增强,使得挑选赢家变得尤为困难。投资者可能既想用望远镜,也想用显微镜——用望远镜广泛地搜寻那些有促进增长议程的经济体,以及将从中受益的行业;用显微镜狭隘地寻找那些具有能从经济增长中获得不成比例收益的制胜因素的公司。

Alfred Sauvy died in October 1990 just as his “second world” was imploding. The Berlin Wall had already come down, and within a few months the Soviet Union would collapse. Would he relish the way events have unfolded since?

阿尔弗雷德•苏维(Alfred Sauvy)于1990年10月去世,当时他的“第二世界”正在崩溃。柏林墙已经倒塌,几个月内苏联就会解体。他会喜欢事态发展的方式吗?

We cannot know. But one thing is certain: the cycle of misery he predicted for the countries he categorized as third world back in 1952 was spectacularly off the mark.

我们无法知道。但有一件事是肯定的:1952年,他预测的第三世界国家的悲惨循环是惊人的离谱。

Other demographers, including Sweden’s Hans Rosling, have expounded views more recently that are far rosier and more accurate thus far. As Rosling has noted, most of the third world is on the same trajectory toward health and prosperity as the first world once was, the difference being that many emerging economies are moving twice as fast. If Sauvy ends up as a footnote for future historians, Rosling’s analysis is likely to be the main thesis.

包括瑞典的汉斯•罗斯林(Hans Rosling)在内的其他人口学家最近也阐述了一些观点,这些观点到目前为止要乐观得多,也更准确。正如罗斯林所指出的,第三世界的大多数国家正沿着与第一世界相同的轨道走向健康和繁荣,不同之处在于许多新兴经济体的发展速度是第一世界的两倍。如果索维最终成为未来历史学家的注脚,罗斯林的分析很可能成为主要论点。

This article appeared first in Milken Institute Review.

这篇文章首先发表在米尔肯研究所的评论上。

为提升阅读体验,智堡对本页面进行了排版优化 查看原文