Financial stability post Brexit: risks from global debt

英国退欧后的金融稳定:全球债务风险

2019/05/14 11:20
对照中文英文原文
乔恩•坎利夫(Jon Cunliffe)在演讲中考察了当前英国金融稳定面临的风险。首先,他着眼于英国退欧可能带来的风险。然后,他考虑了更广泛的金融稳定环境,尤其是全球债务水平。

Thank you for inviting me in January to speak today at your conference on “Financial Stability Post Brexit”. I suspect that when this subject was chosen and the invitation sent, it was assumed that Brexit itself would have happened by the time of the conference. As it is, not only has Brexit not occurred, but the path to it and its eventual outcome are perhaps less clear now than a few months ago.

感谢你们邀请我在今年1月的“英国退欧后的金融稳定”会议上发言。我怀疑,当选择这个主题并发出邀请时,人们认为英国退欧本身就会在会议召开时发生。事实上,英国退欧不仅没有发生,而且通往英国退欧的道路及其最终结果可能比几个月前更不明朗。

So it is perhaps worth spending a little time today on the financial stability risks that might arise from Brexit. I will then go on to examine the financial stability risk environment more generally.

因此,今天花点时间讨论英国退欧可能引发的金融稳定风险或许是值得的。然后,我将更全面地研究金融稳定风险环境。

Before going further, a health warning is necessary. It cannot be repeated too often that the Bank’s approach to its financial stability objective is, in one key respect, very different to its approach to its monetary stability objective. For the latter, the Monetary Policy Committee makes the best forecast we can of the path of the economy and the path of inflation – the central case. We set out clearly and graphically the risks around those forecast, but it is the central case – what we think most likely to happen – that informs our policy decisions.

在更进一步之前,有必要发出健康警告。在一个关键方面,英国央行实现其金融稳定目标的方法与实现其货币稳定目标的方法有很大不同,这一点再怎么强调也不过分。对于后者,货币政策委员会(Monetary Policy Committee)对经济走势和通胀走势做出了我们所能做出的最好预测——这是核心问题。我们清楚而形象地列出了围绕这些预测的风险,但我们认为最有可能发生的核心情况,才是我们做出政策决定的依据。

For financial stability, the focus of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) is not on the central case – on what is most likely to happen; rather it is on the risks – on what could happen even if it is not the most likely scenario. It is the risks, what could happen, that inform our policy decisions.

就金融稳定而言,金融政策委员会(FPC)的重点不在于核心问题——即最有可能发生什么;而是关于风险——关于即使不是最可能发生的情况也可能发生的事情。我们的政策决定是由可能发生的风险决定的。

Brexit

英国退欧

That is why our financial stability focus has been on the risks from a disorderly Brexit.

这就是为什么我们的金融稳定重点一直放在无序退欧的风险上。

The Bank has been working since the referendum to reduce the risks to financial stability and the risk of disruption to financial services, in the event, that the UK leaves the EU without a deal and without any transition period.

自公投以来,英国央行一直在努力降低金融稳定面临的风险,以及万一英国在没有达成协议、没有任何过渡期的情况下脱离欧盟(EU),对金融服务造成破坏的风险。

This has been a pretty large task.

这是一项相当艰巨的任务。

Alongside the Treasury and the FCA we have made sure that we will have a working legal and regulatory framework for the financial sector at the point that EU law no longer applies in the UK.

在欧盟法律不再适用于英国的情况下,我们与英国财政部和FCA一道,确保为金融业建立一个有效的法律和监管框架。

Over 10,000 pages of financial sector related EU legislation has been assessed to see what changes would be required to make the legislation operable in the UK statute book.

超过1万页的欧盟金融业相关立法已被评估,以了解需要做出哪些修改,才能使该立法在英国《规约》(statute book)中具有可操作性。

Over 1,000 pages of amendments have been made by the Treasury in 50 statutory instruments. The Bank has reviewed 6,000 pages of Binding Technical Standards and over 6,500 rules, and published 473 pages of amendments in 15 EU Exit Instruments.

财政部已用50份法定文件对超过1000页的修正案进行了修改。央行审查了6000多页具有约束力的技术标准和6500多条规则,并在15个欧盟退出文书中发表了473页修正案。

We have also put in place temporary permission and recognition regimes so that EU firms providing financial services into the UK will be able to do so without disruption even in the event of a ‘no deal, no transition’ Brexit.

我们还建立了临时许可和承认机制,以便向英国提供金融服务的欧盟公司能够在不受干扰的情况下向英国提供金融服务,即使是在“没有协议,就没有过渡”的情况下。

Some risks have required action on both sides of the Channel. We have worked with the ECB and other EU authorities to identify and mitigate these. We have not, to be frank, agreed on everything and there remain areas of potential disruption that, as of the last FPC assessment, need to be addressed. But, action, at EU and member state level, has been taken on most of the main financial stability risks.

一些风险要求海峡两岸都采取行动。我们已与欧洲央行和其他欧盟机构合作,确定并减轻这些影响。坦率地说,我们还没有就所有问题达成一致意见,而且在FPC上次评估时,仍有一些潜在的干扰领域需要解决。但是,欧盟和成员国层面的行动,已经承担了大部分主要的金融稳定风险。

The other financial stability risk is the general economic impact of a disorderly Brexit upon the financial system.

另一个金融稳定风险是英国无序退欧对金融体系的总体经济影响。

The Bank of England tests the core UK banking system annually against a stress scenario to ensure it has the resilience to absorb the losses that would arise from a very severe but plausible set of domestic, global and market shocks.

英国央行每年都会对英国核心银行体系进行压力测试,以确保其有足够的弹性来消化一系列国内、全球和市场冲击可能带来的损失。

To address resilience to Brexit risks, we developed a worst case Brexit scenario, and compared its impact to the impact of the Bank’s 2018 annual stress test that the core banks had passed.

为了应对英国退欧风险的弹性,我们制定了一个最坏的退欧情景,并将其影响与核心银行通过的2018年年度压力测试的影响进行了比较。

The conclusion was that our annual stress tests comprised stresses of a scale and nature that encompassed even the worst case disorderly Brexit scenario and that the core banking system would be resilient to such an outcome, were it to occur. We have also assessed other parts of the financial system in the same vein. And of course over recent months, as we approached ‘crunch’ Brexit dates and events, we have developed and have been ready to implement contingency plans to respond to financial sector stress.

结论是,我们的年度压力测试包含的压力规模和性质,甚至包括最坏的情况下英国无序退欧的情况,如果出现这种情况,核心银行体系将对这种结果具有弹性。我们也以同样的方式评估了金融体系的其他部分。当然,近几个月来,随着英国退欧日期和事件的临近,我们已经制定并准备实施应急计划,以应对金融业的压力。

I would make three observations about this work that has occupied an increasing amount of the Bank’s resources over the last year and a half.

在过去一年半中,这项工作占用了英国央行越来越多的资源。

First, we have sought to address risks to financial stability. Financial stability is a high hurdle. It does not mean market or economic stability or absence of any disruption or absence of losses.

首先,我们寻求解决金融稳定面临的风险。金融稳定是一个很大的障碍。这并不意味着市场或经济稳定或没有任何破坏或损失。

In the event of a no deal, no transition Brexit, markets would be likely to be very volatile – as they were after the referendum - as prices adjust to that outcome. The banking system has the ability to withstand the losses that would accompany a serious downturn – but one would still expect there to be losses. And, of course, while we have addressed all of the risks we can foresee, stress events can evolve and combine with other events in unpredictable ways.

如果不达成协议,不进行脱欧过渡,随着价格根据公投结果进行调整,市场很可能会像公投后那样剧烈波动。银行体系有能力承受伴随严重衰退而来的损失——但人们仍预计会出现亏损。当然,虽然我们已经解决了所有我们可以预见的风险,但压力事件可以演变,并以不可预测的方式与其他事件结合在一起。

Second, to return to my opening point, the reason we have focused on the risks from a disorderly no deal, no transition Brexit is not because that is what we expect to happen but because the financial system needs to be able to withstand what could happen. The crisis taught us the costs to the economy and to society of a breakdown in the financial system.

第二,回到我的出发点,我们之所以关注无序的、没有协议、没有过渡的英国退欧所带来的风险,并不是因为我们预期会发生这种情况,而是因为金融体系需要能够承受可能发生的情况。这场危机让我们认识到,金融体系崩溃给经济和社会带来的代价。

Third, we have been fully transparent in our assessment of the risks and the actions necessary to address them.

第三,我们在评估风险和采取必要行动应对风险方面保持了完全透明。

The FPC has published its assessment of Brexit risks and it’s ‘Checklist’ of actions necessary on both sides of the Channel regularly since 2017. The FPC also published, in response to a request from Parliament, its severely adverse Brexit stress scenarios.

自2017年以来,金融政策委员会已经发布了对英国退欧风险的评估,以及海峡两岸必要行动的“清单”。应英国议会的要求,金融政策委员会还公布了其对英国退欧的严重不利的压力情景。

This approach has not been without some criticism – in the UK and in the EU. I would argue however that not only is it our statutory duty to report on risks to financial stability but that by making our assessments public we have encouraged others to prepare for the risks.

在英国和欧盟,这种做法面临一些批评。然而,我认为,我们不仅有法定责任报告金融稳定面临的风险,而且通过公开我们的评估,我们鼓励其他人为风险做好准备。

And by making transparent not just our assessment of the resilience of the financial system but the assumptions and judgments that underpin them, we reduce risk by ensuring people can have confidence in the system even if it comes under severe stress.

我们不仅要透明地评估金融体系的弹性,还要透明支撑这些弹性的假设和判断,从而确保人们能够对金融体系抱有信心,从而降低风险,即使金融体系面临严重压力。

Looking further forward, there are two Brexit related financial stability risks that may surface after we have left the EU.

展望未来,我们离开欧盟后,可能会出现两种与英国退欧相关的金融稳定风险。

The first are the risks that may arise from our future relationship with the EU. The choice of that relationship is for government and parliament and not for central bankers. It will need to balance very different economic and social objectives on which views are, as we have seen in recent months, very divided.

首先是我们与欧盟未来关系可能带来的风险。这种关系的选择是政府和议会的,而不是央行的。它将需要平衡非常不同的经济和社会目标,正如我们最近几个月所看到的那样,对这些目标的看法分歧很大。

Financial stability, which is my responsibility in the Bank, is I think an important consideration in that equation, but it is only one consideration.

金融稳定是央行的责任,是这种平衡的重要考虑因素,但只是一个考虑因素。

However, a situation in which the UK is home to the largest and most complex financial centre in the world, along with a large domestic financial sector, but effectively has no say in the regulation of that financial sector would, as I have said before, become very uncomfortable with regard to the Bank’s financial stability objective and our ability to manage financial stability risks.

然而,英国是世界上最大和最复杂的金融中心,坐拥国内大型金融部门,如果没有金融行业监管的话语权,将会对央行的金融稳定目标和管理金融稳定风险带来困难。

By the same token, pressure to weaken regulation post Brexit would create financial stability risks: the FPC has made clear that given the size and complexity of its financial sector post Brexit the UK will need a level of resilience as least as great as that currently planned, which itself exceeds that required by international baseline standards.

出于同样的原因,在英国退欧之后削弱监管的压力将催生金融稳定风险:FPC已经明确表示,鉴于其金融部门的规模和复杂性后,退欧之后英国至少需要和目前计划的相当程度的弹性,这超过了国际基准标准。

The second risk that may arise after we have left the EU, is the related but perhaps more prosaic issue of the flexibility of the UK’s regulatory framework and allocation of responsibilities within it – the division of tasks between Parliament, Government and the regulatory authorities.

我们离开欧盟后可能出现的第二个风险,是相关但或许更为平淡无奇的一个问题,即英国监管框架的灵活性和内部责任的分配——议会、政府和监管机构之间的任务分工。

Much of our financial sector legislation and regulation has been made at the EU level. This has increasingly taken the form of extremely detailed EU primary and secondary legislation directly applicable in Member States.

我们金融业的许多立法和监管都是在欧盟层面制定的。这已越来越多地采取极为详细的直接适用于成员国的欧盟一级和二级立法的形式。

This approach has been justified as necessary in the EU by the need to prevent divergences between member states. The cost, however, as some have observed, is an over complex and rigid regulatory framework.

由于需要防止成员国之间的分歧,这种做法在欧盟被证明是必要的。然而,正如一些人所观察到的,这种做法的成本是一个过于复杂和僵化的监管框架。

As a preparatory step for Brexit, Parliament has ‘onshored’ EU legislation and regulation and also the allocation of responsibilities that lie behind it.

作为英国退欧的一个准备步骤,英国议会“收回”了欧盟的立法和监管,以及其背后的责任分配。

At some point, post Brexit, we will, I think, need to address this rigidity and hard wiring of detail to ensure we have a coherent, effective and flexible regulatory system with appropriate accountability. How we do that will have an impact on how we address risks, at firm and at system level, in a fast changing financial system.

我认为,在英国退欧后的某个时候,我们将需要解决这种僵化和细节的硬连接,以确保我们拥有一个连贯、有效和灵活的监管体系,并承担适当的责任。在快速变化的金融体系中,我们如何做到这一点,将对我们如何在企业和系统层面上应对风险产生影响。

Financial stability post-Brexit

退欧之后的金融稳定

With that nod to the future, I will leave Brexit - for today at any rate – and turn to the examination question you have set for today – financial stability post Brexit. I would like to focus on the question of debt.

鉴于此,我将回答英国退欧后的金融稳定问题。我想集中讨论一下债务问题。

Debt, its level, its growth, its composition and its sustainability lies at the centre of the financial stability mandate.

债务的水平、增长、组成和可持续性是金融稳定目标的核心。

Modern societies and economies are built around the claims we hold on each other. A very large proportion of those claims are expressed as financial claims to be honoured in the future. The future, of course, does not always turn out to be what we expect and the value of our claims has sometimes to be adjusted downwards.

现代社会和经济是建立在我们对彼此的债权之上的。这些债权中有很大一部分是表示将来要偿还的金融债权。当然,未来并不总是如我们所期望的那样,我们的债权价值有时不得不向下调整。

Some financial claims, like equity, adjust the value of the return relatively smoothly. Debt liabilities, however, are fixed and amplify the impact of any negative shock to the income or assets of the debtor. And if the impact cannot be accommodated, the result can be a painful write-down or deleveraging of the economy. Financial crises are much more likely to be associated with corrections of asset values where asset purchases have been financed with debt rather than equity.

一些金融债权,如股票,相对平稳地调整了回报的价值。然而,债务是固定的,并扩大了对债务人收入或资产的任何负面冲击的影响。如果这种影响无法得到缓解,其结果可能是经济的痛苦减记或去杠杆化。金融危机更有可能与资产价值的修正有关,因为资产购买是通过债务而非股票融资的。

Aggregate global debt – public, private and financial – is now around 320% of global GDP, close to its record highs. Excluding financial sector debt, the debt of the real economy is around 240% of global GDP.

全球债务总额——包括公共债务、私人债务和金融债务——目前约占全球GDP的320%,接近历史最高水平。不包括金融业债务,实体经济的债务约为全球GDP的240%。

But aggregates can only tell you so much. And they can hide a multitude of sins. We need to need to look not just at the level of the total, but the growth rate and sustainability. And we need to drill down into the composition to see where the risks are most prominent.

但是总量只能告诉你这么多。他们可以隐藏许多问题。我们不仅要看总量,还要看增长速度和可持续性。我们需要深入研究其构成,找出风险最突出的地方。

Growth, level and sustainability

增长、水平和可持续性

Research suggests that it is the growth rate of debt rather than its actual level that is the leading indicator of financial crises. Bank of England work based on 130 downturns in 26 advanced economies since the 1970s suggests that a rapid build up of debt is the best early warning indicator of a recession.Other academic work supports this conclusion.

研究表明,衡量金融危机的主要指标是债务增长率,而非实际水平。英国央行基于上世纪70年代以来26个发达经济体的130次衰退所做的研究表明,债务的迅速累积是衰退的最佳预警指标。其他学术研究也支持这一结论。

The actual level of debt matters rather in determining the depth, as opposed to the probability, of the crisis. So we need to look at the growth rate as well as the level.

债务的实际水平,而不是危机发生的可能性,对决定危机的深度更重要。所以我们需要看增长率和水平。

Between 2000 and the crisis in 2008, total global debt as a proportion of global GDP grew by over 60 percentage points, a growth rate of nearly 30%. Between 2008 and 2018 it has grown by around 25 percentage points, a growth rate over the last 10 years of just under 10%.

2000年至2008年金融危机期间,全球债务总额占GDP的比重增长超过60个百分点,增幅近30%。从2008年到2018年,这一比率增长了约25个百分点,过去10年的增长率略低于10%。

However, the bulk of the post crisis growth occurred in the first 5 years after the crisis as governments stepped in to offset private sector deleveraging and support the economy. Since then, global debt has stabilized, growing by only 1% in total, relative to global GDP, over the past 5 years.

然而,危机后的增长主要发生在危机后的头5年,因为政府介入,抵消了私人部门去杠杆化的影响,并为经济提供支持。从那时起,全球债务已经稳定下来,在过去5年里,相对于全球GDP,全球债务总额仅增长了1%。

The aggregate growth rate is not therefore signaling an impending correction. The level, however, may well represent a significant vulnerability given that high levels of debt are associated with deeper and more persistent recessions.

因此,总增长率并不是即将出现修正的信号。然而,鉴于高债务水平与更深、更持久的衰退有关,这一水平很可能代表着一个重大的脆弱性。

Assessing the sustainability of this debt is more difficult. Whether debt is sustainable depends on the difference between the interest rate and the growth rate of the income stream that will be used to repay the debt. The future is not known – in assessing today whether a given level of debt is sustainable, we must rely on our best forecast of future interest rates and growth.

评估这种债务的可持续性更加困难。债务是否可持续取决于利率和用于偿还债务的收入流的增长率之间的差异。未来是未知的——在评估当前给定的债务水平是否可持续时,我们必须依赖对未来利率和增长的最佳预测。

The level of debt that is sustainable in an economy is not a constant. It can change over time and indeed has changed enormously over the last 150 years. The ratio of credit to GDP in the late Victorian British economy was under 20% (not including the financial sector). In the mid-twentieth century it was around 60% and by the early 1990s over 100%.

一个经济体中可持续的债务水平不是一个常数。它可以随着时间的推移而改变,在过去的150年里确实发生了巨大的变化。在维多利亚时代晚期的英国经济中,信贷占GDP的比例低于20%(不包括金融业)。20世纪中叶,这一比例约为60%,到90年代初,这一比例已超过100%。

It is influenced by many factors including, very importantly, the long run real rate of interest. There is strong evidence that the long run, or trend real rate has come down materially over the past 40 years as a result of slow moving, secular changes in the supply of savings and the demand for investment.

它受到许多因素的影响,其中最重要的是长期实际利率。有强有力的证据表明,由于储蓄供应和投资需求的缓慢、长期变化,过去40年来,长期趋势实际利率已大幅下降。

The MPC published analysis last August suggesting that the trend real rate in the UK has fallen by more than 2pp since 1990. Slower population growth, increased life expectancy and slower productivity growth have all contributed to this fall.

英国货币政策委员会去年8月发表的分析报告显示,自1990年以来,英国的趋势实际利率已下降逾2个百分点。人口增长放缓、预期寿命延长和生产率增长放缓都是造成这一下降的原因。

Looking forward, many of the structural factors currently weighing on the trend real rate – in particular, changes in demographics – are likely to persist for many years to come, though other factors could push in the opposite direction.

展望未来,目前影响实际利率趋势的许多结构性因素——尤其是人口结构的变化——可能会持续多年,尽管其他因素可能会朝着相反的方向推进。

The trend real rate of interest, however, cannot be observed directly. It can only be estimated and while most estimates suggest it has reduced materially, estimates do vary widely.

然而,趋势实际利率无法直接观察到。它只能被估计,虽然大多数估计表明它已大大减少,但估计相差很大。

As to income growth, to the extent that expected low real rates reflect expected lower productivity and hence expected lower income growth, they would not make debt more sustainable.

至于收入增长,如果预期较低的实际利率反映了预期较低的生产力,因此预期较低的收入增长,就不会使债务更具有可持续性。

Over the economic cycle, of course, the short-term real rate of interest will be moved around its longer-term trend by more temporary factors. But the persistence of the fall in the trend real rate means interest rates are likely to need to remain low by historical standards for some time to come. One might therefore expect this generally to support the sustainability of global debt overall, though given the uncertainties of estimates and forecasts of trend real rates, there are clearly risks to this assessment.

当然,在整个经济周期中,短期实际利率将会被更多暂时性因素围绕其长期趋势变动。但实际利率趋势持续下降,意味着未来一段时间内,利率可能需要保持在历史低位。因此,人们可能普遍认为这将支持全球债务的整体可持续性,尽管考虑到对趋势实际利率的估计和预测的不确定性,这种评估显然存在风险。

Composition

构成

From a financial stability viewpoint, the composition of the debt stock matters. Even if the aggregate level of debt is not growing and there are reasons to believe its sustainability may generally be supported by relatively low rates going forward, components of the debt stock can vary greatly in riskiness and vulnerability to correction.

从金融稳定的角度来看,债务存量的构成很重要。即使债务总水平没有增长,而且有理由相信,未来相对较低的利率可能普遍支持债务的可持续性,但债务存量的组成部分在风险和易受修正性方面可能有很大差异。

The composition of the global debt stock has changed since the crisis.

自金融危机以来,全球债务存量的构成发生了变化。

Overall, advanced economy private sector debt has reduced a little since the crisis. The increase in advanced economy debt has been in the public sector.

总体而言,发达经济体私人部门的债务自危机以来略有减少。发达经济体债务的增加一直发生在公共部门。

I do not want here to enter into a discussion of fiscal sustainability and limits to government borrowing. But I would observe, from a narrow financial stability perspective, that growth of own currency sovereign debt, especially when financed internally, is not a good predictor of financial crises. Elevated own currency sovereign debt can certainly weigh very heavily on economies but its adverse effects are usually chronic rather acute.

我不想在这里讨论财政可持续性和政府借款的限制。但我将从狭隘的金融稳定角度观察,本币主权债务的增长,尤其是在内部融资的情况下,并不能很好地预测金融危机。本币主权债务上升肯定会给经济带来非常沉重的压力,但其负面影响通常是长期的,而非严重的。

The rotation of debt in advanced economies from the private sector to the government, post crisis, makes it more likely that any correction will lead to chronic rather than acute problems.

发达经济体的债务在危机后从私人部门转向政府,使得任何调整都更有可能导致长期而非严重的问题。

By contrast, the decline in the aggregate level of advanced economy private debt may not be as comforting as it is appears. Aggregates, as I have said, can hide a multitude of sins.

相比之下,发达经济体私人债务总水平的下降,可能并不像看上去那么令人欣慰。正如我所说,总量可以隐藏许多问题。

Household debt came down post crisis in most advanced economies – falling from 83% of GDP in 2009 to around 73% today – and has grown very slowly, if at all, since, moving within a percentage point for the last five years.

在大多数发达经济体,家庭债务在危机后有所下降——从2009年占GDP的83%下降到今天的73%左右——而且增长非常缓慢,如果有的话,在过去的五年里,家庭债务只增长了一个百分点。

Financial sector debt in advanced economies has also grown very slowly after the very painful deleveraging of the financial sector during and after the crisis. This reflects greater risk aversion in the banking sector reinforced by the much higher level of capital banks are now required to hold against losses, a very positive development for financial stability.

在金融部门在危机期间和之后经历了非常痛苦的去杠杆化之后,发达经济体的金融业债务增长也非常缓慢。这反映出银行部门更大程度的避险意识,而银行现在必须持有更高水平的资本金以抵御亏损,这对金融稳定来说是一个非常积极的发展。

Corporate debt in advanced economies, however, is a more mixed story. It has not grown much overall over the past 5 years. But within that, over the past 3 years its growth rate has accelerated in some countries – particularly the US and France. And perhaps more importantly, while the totals may not be changing much, the riskiness has been increasing.

然而,发达经济体的企业债务情况则更为复杂。在过去的5年里,发达经济体的企业债务总体上没有多大增长。但是过去3年,一些国家的企业债务增长速度有所加快,尤其是美国和法国。也许更重要的是,虽然总数可能没有太大变化,但风险一直在增加。

Within corporate debt, the proportion of leveraged lending and lower grade corporate bonds has risen rapidly in recent years, and in the UK and US there is a larger tail of highly indebted companies than there was before the crisis.

近年来,在企业债务中,杠杆贷款和较低评级企业债券的比例迅速上升,而在英国和美国,高负债企业的尾部比危机前更大。

Alongside this, protections for investors have been weakened materially. There has been an increase in borrower leverage, greater use of earnings add-backs and a relaxation of other investor protections like restrictions on collateral transfers. The share of ‘covenant-lite’ loans has reached record highs.

与此同时,对投资者的保护也被严重削弱。借款人杠杆率有所上升,收益回拨的使用有所增加,对抵押品转让的限制等其他投资者保护措施也有所放松。“低门槛”贷款的比例已达到创纪录的高点。

Leveraged loans originate in the banking system. Much of the exposure, however, appears to have been passed on to market based investors, such as investment funds, insurance companies and pension funds either directly or in the form of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs).

杠杆贷款起源于银行系统。然而,大部分风险敞口似乎已直接或以贷款抵押债券(CLOs)的形式转移给了以市场为基础的投资者,例如投资基金、保险公司和养老基金。

The growth of market-based finance has been one of the major changes of the post crisis financial landscape. Assets under management (AuM) globally now total $184 trillion as opposed to $100 trillion ten years ago. The growth in corporate borrowing over the same period has largely come through the market-based channel, rather than banks, as has the increase in net external borrowing by emerging markets.

市场化金融的发展是后危机时代金融格局的重要变化之一。目前全球管理的资产总额为184万亿美元,而十年前为100万亿美元。同期企业借款的增长主要来自于市场渠道,而非银行,新兴市场净外部借款的增长也是如此。

The development of market based finance in and of itself probably increases the resilience of the financial system by providing an alternative channel of credit.

以市场为基础的金融的发展本身可能通过提供另一种信贷渠道,提高金融体系的弹性。

Its use of leverage is much less than the banking channel. Investors using the market-based channel have a claim on the value of their investments not the nominal amount they invested and their claims should therefore be able to adjust to losses more smoothly.

它对杠杆的使用远低于银行渠道。使用以市场为基础的渠道的投资者对其投资的价值拥有债权,而不是他们投资的名义金额,因此他们的债权应该能够更平稳地适应损失。

Nonetheless, market-based finance often involves liquidity and maturity transformation and can be subject to run risk. And one of the developments over the last ten years has been the expansion of the investment fund component of market finance into riskier and less liquid areas.

然而,基于市场的金融往往涉及流动性和期限转换,并可能面临风险。过去10年的发展之一,是将市场金融的投资基金组成部分扩大到风险更大、流动性更差的领域。

We know much less about how this channel of finance will behave under stress say, following the loss of confidence in an asset class such as high yield corporate debt and leveraged loans.

我们对这种融资渠道在压力下的表现知之甚少,比如,在投资者对高收益公司债券和杠杆贷款等资产类别失去信心之后。

High yield corporate bonds and leveraged loans are only 15% of advanced economy corporate debt. But while it is important to look at aggregates, it is also worth recalling that a very sharp correction in a relatively small asset class can have major repercussions: the stock of US subprime mortgage was only $1.1 trillion in 2006, or 13% of the total stock of US mortgages.

高收益公司债券和杠杆贷款仅占发达经济体企业债务的15%。虽然看总量是很重要的,但是相对较小的资产类别的大幅回调可以有重大影响:美国次级抵押贷款的股票在2006年只有1.1万亿美元,占美国抵押贷款存量的13%。

There are of course many differences between leveraged loans and associated CDOs and subprime. But, as the Financial Stability Board announced last week, it is now a priority for the international regulatory community to understand better how this market might behave under stress and who is holding the risk.

当然,杠杆贷款与相关CDO和次级抵押贷款之间有许多不同之处。但是,正如金融稳定委员会(Financial Stability Board)上周宣布的那样,现在国际监管机构的首要任务是更好地了解这个市场在压力下可能会如何表现,以及谁在承担风险。

The other striking development that I would note in the evolution of debt over the past 10 years has been in emerging markets, primarily China, rather than advanced economy debt. Emerging market debt now accounts for over a quarter of the global total compared to an eighth before the crisis.

在过去10年的债务演变过程中,我要指出的另一个引人注目的发展是新兴市场,主要是中国,而不是发达经济体的债务。新兴市场债务目前占全球债务总额的四分之一以上,而危机前这一比例仅为八分之一。

Within this, there has been a persistent buildup of private debt to record levels in China: excluding the financial sector, private debt has risen from 115% in 2008 to 203% of GDP.

在此背景下,中国的私人债务持续累积,达到创纪录水平:不包括金融业在内,私人债务占GDP的比重已从2008年的115%升至203%。

The majority of this increase occurred in the years after the financial crisis but Chinese private debt has continued to grow, by 30 percentage points of GDP, over the past 5 years, much of it intermediated through the less regulated shadow banking sector. The largest increases have been in the corporate sector, mainly in state owned enterprises, but more recently household debt has begun to grow quickly.

其中大部分增长发生在金融危机后的几年里,但中国私人债务在过去5年里持续增长,占GDP的30%,其中很大一部分是通过监管较少的影子银行业进行中介的。增幅最大的是企业部门,主要是国有企业,但最近家庭债务开始迅速增长。

As published by the Bank in the past, the rate of growth and level have passed the points where other economies, advanced and emerging, have experienced sharp corrections in the past (Chart 1).

正如国际清算银行过去公布的那样,增长速度和水平已经超过了其他经济体(发达经济体和新兴经济体)过去经历大幅调整的水平(图1)。

The Chinese authorities have, since the start of 2017, taken material policy measures to de risk the financial sector and bring the growth rate of debt into line with the growth rate of nominal GDP.

自2017年初以来,中国政府采取了重大政策措施,降低金融业风险,使债务增速与名义GDP增速保持一致。

More recently, however, in the face of slowing economic growth, they have adopted a range of measures to support domestic credit. A sharp slowdown in economic growth would make China’s elevated debt levels significantly less sustainable.

然而,最近,面对经济增长放缓,它们采取了一系列措施来支持国内信贷。经济增长大幅放缓将大大降低中国高企的债务水平的可持续性。

China’s external debt is small and denominated in its currency. Although a number of international banks are active in its jurisdiction, its financial system is not highly integrated into the global system. A debt correction in China would first and most directly affect the Chinese economy.

中国的外债规模较小,以人民币计价。虽然一些国际银行在其管辖范围内很活跃,但其金融体系并没有高度融入全球体系。中国的债务调整将首先且最直接地影响中国经济。

The impacts could be expected to spillover, however, to wider financial stability through a number of channels.

然而,预计这些影响将通过若干渠道溢出至更广泛的金融稳定。

The Chinese economy is now pivotal to regional growth and one of the main pillars of world growth and trade. As well as the economic effects and effects directly through banking exposures, it is likely that there would be a severe impact on financial market sentiment, this effect was seen in 2015 when a period of sharp correction in domestic Chinese financial markets sparked a correction in US financial assets.

中国经济对地区增长至关重要,是世界经济增长和贸易的主要支柱之一。除了经济影响和直接通过银行敞口产生的影响外,很可能还会对金融市场情绪产生严重影响,这种影响在2015年就显现出来了,当时中国国内金融市场经历了一段时间的大幅回调,引发了美国金融资产的回调。

Pricing of risk

风险定价

Finally, I have tried today to trace a line from financial stability risks in the overall level and growth rate of global debt to those that may lie beneath the surface of the aggregate numbers.

最后,我今天试图从全球债务总体水平和增长率的金融稳定风险,到可能隐藏在总体数字表面之下的风险,寻找一条界线。

Another perspective on the risks around debt is pricing – whether investors have taken all risks into account, and priced them prudently or whether there’s a degree of optimism that is reflected in the pricing (just as optimism can be a factor in rising debt levels).

关于债务风险的另一个观点是定价——投资者是否考虑了所有风险,并谨慎定价,或者定价中是否反映出一定程度的乐观情绪(正如乐观情绪可能是债务水平上升的一个因素)。

Pricing for much of the stock of global debt is not easily visible, but for debt traded in markets – typically corporate bonds – we can observe the following.

全球债务的定价并不容易看出来,但对于在市场上交易的债券——通常是公司债券——我们可以观察到以下几点。

Spreads – the amount charged for risk, be that credit risk or liquidity risk – are low by historical standards at the moment. The relatively low compensation demanded for risk can also be seen in the small difference between the price of investment grade and high yield bonds.

目前,以历史标准衡量,利差——即信贷风险或流动性风险——处于低位。对风险的补偿要求相对较低,也可以从投资级债券与高收益债券的价格差异较小看出。

We can observe some of these trends in non-traded debt.Spreads on leveraged loans are roughly 100bps lower than they were in 2015 for the US, which comprises most of the global market, and 70 bps lower in the UK.

我们可以观察到不可交易债务的一些趋势。在占全球市场大部分的美国,杠杆贷款息差比2015年低约100个基点,在英国则低70个基点。

Alongside this low pricing for risk, volatility is low. The VIX ended April at about 13 – well below its 21st century average of about 20. And US equities are similarly priced – implying investors are demanding a low equity risk premium.

除了这种低风险定价,波动性也很低。波动率指数4月底约为13,远低于21世纪以来约20的平均水平。美国股票的定价也类似——这意味着投资者要求较低的股票风险溢价。

Moreover, risk-free rates are low in many jurisdictions, and yield curves are broadly flat in all major jurisdictions. This suggests there is little market expectation of any pickup in growth or, perhaps more notably, inflation. Similar conditions have persisted for much of the last few years.

此外,许多地区的无风险利率较低,而所有主要地区的收益率曲线基本持平。这表明,市场对经济增长或通胀(或许更值得注意)出现回升的预期微乎其微。类似的情况在过去几年的大部分时间里一直存在。

An environment of low pricing for risk and low volatility might appear to suggest that global markets are not expecting large changes in asset prices.

低风险定价和低波动性的环境似乎表明,全球市场预计资产价格不会出现大幅变动。

And yet, in a short period over the end of last year and start of this one we saw very sharp moves across asset markets in response to what seemed relatively modest amounts of news. Between mid-October and the end of the year spreads on investment grade bonds, for example, went up by around 50bps.

然而,在去年年底和今年年初的短时间内,我们看到整个资产市场对相对温和的消息做出了非常剧烈的反应。例如,从10月中旬到年底,投资级债券的息差上升了约50个基点。

Since then, these moves have completely retraced – spreads at the start of May were the same as they were in mid-October last year. Bonds in other currencies and high yield bonds went on a similar round trip. At one point towards the end of 2018, the S&P was 15% lower than it had been just 3 weeks earlier – it is now at record highs.

自那以来,这些变动已完全逆转——5月初的息差与去年10月中旬持平。以其他货币计价的债券和高收益债券也出现了类似的走势。2018年底,标普500指数一度比三周前低15%,目前处于创纪录高位。

The fall in financial asset prices seems to have been due in no small part first to market concerns about future economic growth and the recovery to better news about the world economy and to the signal of greater support to economic growth from central banks than had hitherto been perceived.

金融资产价格的下跌似乎已经在很大程度上归因于市场对未来经济增长的担忧。

But the episode may also suggest that when it comes to expectations about the value of debt, the market itself is very sensitive to changes in sentiment and a correction might come very quickly, either because of weakening expectations of economic performance or signs of inflation. Given the apparent current compression of risk pricing, such a correction could be a sharp one.

但这一事件也可能表明,当谈到对债务价值的预期时,市场本身对市场人气的变化非常敏感,调整可能很快就会到来,原因要么是对经济表现的预期减弱,要么是通胀迹象。鉴于当前风险定价明显受到挤压,这种调整可能是一次剧烈的调整。

Conclusion

结论

The level of the global debt stock relative to GDP remains near its record high, though it has stabilized over the past five years. The sustainable level of debt to GDP is not, however, a constant and there are reasons to believe that the lower trend real rate will likely support sustainability. While less expected, however, a relatively small increase in the trend rate could lead to a reassessment of debt sustainability.

全球债务存量与GDP之比仍接近历史最高水平,不过在过去5年已经企稳。然而,债务占GDP的可持续水平不是一个常数,我们有理由相信,较低的趋势实际利率可能会支持可持续发展。然而,尽管预期较低,但趋势利率相对较小的增长可能导致对债务可持续性的重新评估。

While there is evidence that the level of debt, as opposed to the growth rate, does not appear to be a good predictor of recessions and financial crises, the level does seem to be associated with depth of losses when crises occur. The historically high level of debt may generally suggest a higher vulnerability in periods of stress.

尽管有证据表明,债务水平(相对于增长率而言)似乎不能很好地预测衰退和金融危机,但债务水平似乎确实与危机发生时的损失深度有关。历史上高水平的债务通常意味着在压力时期更容易受到冲击。

The composition of debt, within the aggregate numbers, has changed since the crisis. Emerging market debt has grown as a proportion of the global debt stock, over the past 10 years, with much of the increase driven by China. Advanced economy public debt has risen but household and financial sector debt is lower now and the lower post crisis levels have been stable for a number of years.

自金融危机以来,债务构成(总体数字)发生了变化。过去10年,新兴市场债务占全球债务总额的比例一直在增长,其中大部分增长是由中国推动的。发达经济体的公共债务有所上升,但家庭和金融部门的债务目前较低,而危机后较低的水平多年来一直保持稳定。

Advanced economy corporate debt, however, has grown rapidly in recent years in some major jurisdictions, particularly the US, and its riskiness has increased. The pricing of risk in financial markets is relatively compressed by historic standards, as is market volatility. But recent events suggest the market may be very sensitive to changes in expectations of growth or inflation.

然而,发达经济体企业债务近年来在一些主要司法管辖区(尤其是美国)增长迅速,其风险也有所增加。以历史标准衡量,金融市场的风险定价相对较低,市场波动性也是如此。但最近的事件表明,市场可能对增长或通胀预期的变化非常敏感。

As always, the risk picture is mixed. From a financial stability perspective, the right response to this picture is to ensure that the financial system is sufficiently resilient to a very severe but plausible correction in values should it occur.

与往常一样,风险状况好坏参半。从金融稳定的角度来看,对这一局面的正确反应是,确保金融体系在出现非常严重但似乎合理的价值调整时,具有足够的弹性。

A colleague of mine recently asked me why the financial stability side of the Bank was so gloomy, always pointing to risks on the horizon and seeing the glass as half empty at best? My answer was that it was our job to worry about what could plausibly happen - and to ensure that if it did happen, the glass did not suddenly empty entirely.

最近,我的一位同事问我,为什么英国央行在金融稳定方面如此悲观(总是把矛头指向即将发生的风险,最多也只能看到半杯水)?我的回答是,我们的工作是担心可能发生的事情,并确保如果真的发生了,杯子不会突然完全空了。

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