Latin America’s missing middle of midsize firms and middle-class spending power

拉丁美洲失去了中型企业和中产阶级消费能力

2019/05/13 00:00
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对照中文英文原文
数字可以帮助该地区找到失踪的中间环境,重新启动包容性增长,并重新夺回失地。

Latin America used to be the world’s most prosperous emerging region, but it is on the verge of being overtaken by other regions that were long considerably poorer. It has lost ground since the 1980s despite reform initiatives because of sluggish growth and the unequal distribution of the gains of that growth.

拉丁美洲曾经是世界上最繁荣的新兴地区,但它正处于被其他长期贫困地区所取代的边缘。自1980年代以来,由于增长缓慢和增长成果分配不均,尽管提出了改革倡议,它还是失去了一些地盘。

Latin America’s missing middle: Rebooting inclusive growth (PDF—2MB) focuses mainly on Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico, and examines two “missing middles” holding the region back: a robust cohort of midsize companies and a solid middle class with growing spending power. The two are connected: expanding the pool of modern, competitive firms can create better paying jobs, and lift middle-class demand needed for new investment. The disruption presented by adoption of digital technologies provides an opportunity to reignite this virtuous cycle of growth—but it will require reforms to help companies compete and workers prepare.

拉丁美洲缺失的中产阶级:重新启动包容性增长(PDF-2MB)主要关注巴西、哥伦比亚和墨西哥,并考察了阻碍该地区发展的两个“缺失的中产阶级”:一批强劲的中型企业和一个购买力不断增长的坚实中产阶级。这两者是有联系的:扩大现代的、有竞争力的公司的范围,可以创造更高报酬的工作,并提高中产阶级对新投资的需求。采用数字技术带来的破坏为重新点燃这种良性增长循环提供了机会,但这需要改革,以帮助企业竞争和工人做好准备。

  • Latin America faces a dual challenge of slow GDP growth and unequal distribution of the gains of that growth
  • 拉丁美洲面临着国内生产总值增长缓慢和增长成果分配不均的双重挑战
  • A missing middle of dynamic midsize companies reduces competition and innovation
  • 缺乏充满活力的中型企业,会降低竞争和创新
  • A missing middle of consumer holds back domestic demand and incentives for investment
  • 消费者群体的缺失抑制了国内需求和投资激励
  • Filling in the missing middles and capturing the next wave of growth
  • 填补缺失的中间环节,抓住下一波增长

Growth in Latin America has been slower and more volatile than in other emerging economies, and the unequally distributed gains from that growth have failed to ignite the domestic economy and sustain growth.

与其他新兴经济体相比,拉丁美洲的增长速度更慢,波动性更大,而且增长带来的不平等收益未能刺激国内经济并维持增长。

GDP growth in the region averaged 2.8 percent annually between 2000 and 2016, far lower than the 4.8 percent rate in 56 other emerging economies in the same period (not including China, which grew at twice that pace). Among Latin American economies, Peru grew most strongly, averaging 5.2 percent per year. Of the three countries that are the focus of this report, Colombia performed best, with average growth of 4.2 percent. Brazil’s growth rate, at 2.4 percent, was closer to the regional average, while Mexico’s was weaker, at 2.1 percent. In addition to being weak, regional growth has been volatile, buoyed by the commodity boom, which saw prices for resources such as oil, mineral, and some agricultural products surge, only to fall back sharply.

2000年至2016年间,该地区GDP年均增长2.8%,远低于同期其他56个新兴经济体的4.8%(不包括中国,后者的增速是前者的两倍)。在拉美经济体中,秘鲁增长最为强劲,平均每年增长5.2%。在这份报告关注的三个国家中,哥伦比亚表现最好,平均增长率为4.2%。巴西2.4%的增长率接近该地区平均水平,而墨西哥2.1%的增长率较低。除了疲软之外,受大宗商品繁荣的推动,该地区的增长也一直不稳定。大宗商品繁荣导致石油、矿产和一些农产品等资源价格飙升,但最终大幅回落。

The largest driver of GDP growth in Latin America has been expansion of the labor force, the result of a demographic boom and increased participation of women. The workforce grew by 66 million workers between 2000 and 2016, and this expansion accounted for 72 percent of the region’s overall GDP growth. The demographics are now changing: fertility rates in Latin America declined from 4.2 in 1980 to replacement rate in 2015. This means the region will need to count on productivity growth rather than labor expansion as the main driver of GDP growth. This would bring Latin America into line with other emerging economies, where labor expansion has been a much smaller factor in driving GDP growth—37 percent on average in 56 countries excluding China—and considerably less important than productivity growth.

拉丁美洲GDP增长的最大推动力是劳动力的扩大,这是人口增长和妇女参与增加的结果。从2000年到2016年,劳动力增加了6600万,占该地区GDP增长的72%。人口结构正在发生变化:拉丁美洲的生育率从1980年的4.2下降到2015年的更替率。这意味着该地区将需要依靠生产率增长,而不是劳动力扩张作为GDP增长的主要驱动力。这将使拉丁美洲与其他新兴经济体并驾齐驱。在这些经济体中,劳动力扩张对GDP增长的推动作用要小得多——除中国外,其他56个国家的平均增幅为37%——而且远不及生产率增长那么重要。

The largest driver of GDP growth in Latin America has been expansion of the labor force, the result of a demographic boom and increased participation of women.

拉丁美洲GDP增长的最大推动力是劳动力的扩大,这是人口增长和妇女参与增加的结果。

A sharp reduction in poverty is a notable success, but more than 150 million people in Latin America remain vulnerable

大幅减少贫困是一项显著的成功,但拉丁美洲仍有1.5亿多人处于弱势

Since 2000, 56 million people—or more than 40 percent of Latin America’s poor in 2000—have crossed the $5 per day absolute poverty threshold, reducing the overall proportion of people in poverty to 13 percent of the total from 27 percent. Both the income boom from rising commodity prices and governments’ pro-poor policies propelled this movement. These include conditional cash transfer programs in Mexico and Brazil, which tie transfers to keeping children in school or making preventive healthcare visits. Bolsa Família, the Brazilian program launched in 2003, now reaches 14 million households, about one-quarter of the population, and helped bring down the proportion of those living in extreme poverty from 10 percent to 4.3 percent over a decade. The poverty-reduction momentum has slowed in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and the end of the commodity boom, however. By 2018, poverty and extreme poverty rates had risen above the levels of a decade earlier.

自2000年以来,5600万人(2000年拉丁美洲贫困人口的40%以上)已经超过了每天5美元的绝对贫困标准,贫困人口占总人口的比例从27%降至13%。大宗商品价格上涨带来的收入增长,以及政府的扶贫政策,都推动了这场运动。其中包括墨西哥和巴西的有条件现金转移项目,该项目将转移与让孩子上学或进行预防性医疗访问联系起来。巴西于2003年启动的Bolsa Familia计划,目前已惠及1400万户家庭,约占巴西总人口的四分之一,并在十年间帮助将极度贫困人口的比例从10%降至4.3%。然而,在2008年全球金融危机和大宗商品繁荣结束后,减贫势头有所放缓。到2018年,贫困和极端贫困率已超过10年前的水平。

While poverty has been reduced since 2000, the slow expansion of higher-productivity and higher-wage jobs has left many vulnerable. No longer officially poor, they have not yet reached comfortable middle-class spending patterns—meaning they are still unable to afford goods and services that go beyond basic needs and may not have access to credit—and remain at high risk of falling back into poverty during a recession or in the event of a health or employment crisis. More than one-third of the region’s population lives on less than $11 per day, based on purchasing power parity, including 152 million people in the “vulnerable” category of $5 to $11 per day (over 60 percent from Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico). More than 60 percent of the population lives on less than $20 per day (Exhibit 1).

尽管贫困自2000年以来有所减少,但生产率和工资水平较高的工作岗位的缓慢扩张,使许多人处于弱势。正式不再贫穷,他们没有达到舒适的中产阶级消费patterns-meaning仍无力购买商品和服务,超出基本需要和可能没有获得信贷和高危仍在经济衰退时期重新陷入贫困或健康或就业危机的事件。根据购买力平价计算,该地区超过三分之一的人口每天生活费不足11美元,其中1.52亿人属于每天5美元至11美元的“弱势”人群(60%以上来自巴西、哥伦比亚和墨西哥)。超过60%的人口每天的生活费不足20美元(表1)。

Exhibit 1

展示1

The bottom 90 percent in Latin American households consumes just 64 percent of the total, the lowest share in the world

拉丁美洲底层90%的家庭只消费了总消费的64%,是世界上最低的比例

Consumers crossing over to the middle class have more money and more access to credit to spend beyond basic necessities and they tend to spend a higher share of their income than more affluent people. However, social inequality marks consumption patterns in Latin America. The bottom 90 percent of the income distribution in Latin America—the region’s poor and vulnerable, and most of the middle class—accounts for just 64 percent of domestic consumption. This is the lowest share in the world, akin to that in Sub-Saharan Africa but substantially lagging behind other regions, where the bottom 90 percent consumes about 70 percent or more of the total (Exhibit 2).

中产阶级的消费者有更多的钱,也有更多的机会获得信贷,在基本生活必需品之外进行消费,而且他们在收入中所占的比例往往高于富人。然而,社会不平等标志着拉丁美洲的消费模式。拉丁美洲收入分配的底层90%——该地区的穷人和弱势群体,以及大多数中产阶级——只占国内消费的64%。这是世界上最低的份额,类似于撒哈拉以南非洲地区,但远远落后于其他地区,在这些地区,底层90%的人消费了总消费的70%或更多(表2)。

Exhibit 2

附表2

The business landscape in Latin America is polarized. The region has some powerful companies, including some with very high productivity that have successfully expanded from their strong local base to become global companies or “multilatinas”—regional powerhouses operating across Latin America. They include AB InBev, America Movil, Arcor, Bimbo, CEMEX, Embraer, FEMSA, Techint Group, among others. By comparison with large firms in other regions, such companies are fewer in number and less diversified beyond energy, materials, and utilities. At the same time, Latin America has a long tail of small, often informal companies that collectively provide large-scale employment, but whose low productivity and stagnant growth hold back the economy.

拉丁美洲的商业格局两极分化。该地区有一些实力雄厚的企业,包括一些生产率非常高的企业,它们已成功地从强大的本地基础发展成为全球性企业或“多拉美国家”(multi - Latin inas)——在拉美各地运营的区域性强国。其中包括百威英博、美洲移动、Arcor、Bimbo、CEMEX、Embraer、FEMSA、Techint Group等。与其他地区的大公司相比,这些公司的数量更少,除了能源、材料和公用事业之外,其多样化程度也更低。与此同时,拉丁美洲有一长串小公司,通常是非正规公司,它们共同提供大规模就业,但生产力低下和增长停滞阻碍了经济发展。

Missing is a cohort of vibrant midsize companies that could bring dynamism and competitive pressure to expand the number of productive and well-paying jobs in Latin America, much as these firms do in many high-performing emerging regions. Exhibit 3 shows how much less prevalent large and midsize companies (over $50 million in revenue) are for the size of the Latin American economy compared with peers elsewhere. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico have only about half as many of these large firms relative to GDP as a range of ten emerging economies we use as benchmarks.

缺少的是一批充满活力的中型企业,它们可能带来活力和竞争压力,以扩大拉美生产性和高薪工作岗位的数量,就像这些企业在许多表现良好的新兴地区所做的那样。表3显示了与其他地区的同行相比,大中型企业(收入超过5000万美元)在拉美经济规模中所占比例要小得多。阿根廷、巴西、智利和墨西哥的大型企业与GDP之比仅为我们用来作为基准的10个新兴经济体的一半左右。

Exhibit 3

展览3

Latin America’s large companies can face less dynamic domestic competition than peers in other regions

与其他地区的同行相比,拉丁美洲的大公司面临的国内竞争可能不那么激烈

The missing middle of companies reduces competitive pressure on large incumbents. In comparing Latin American companies with large firms in a benchmark set of ten countries—China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey—we find several indications that the competitive dynamics are less powerful, but with important variation across countries. (We chose these benchmarks based on geographic variation and similar levels of development, but we do not claim they are globally representative.)

企业中缺失的中间层降低了大型企业的竞争压力。在将拉丁美洲公司与中国、印度、印度尼西亚、马来西亚、菲律宾、波兰、俄罗斯、南非、泰国和土耳其等10个国家的大公司进行比较时,我们发现了一些迹象,表明竞争动力不那么强大,但各国之间存在重要差异。(我们选择这些基准是基于地理差异和相似的发展水平,但我们并不声称它们具有全球代表性。)

The missing middle of companies reduces competitive pressure on large incumbents.

企业中缺失的中间层降低了大型企业的竞争压力。

First, the number of public companies with revenue rising above $100 million since 2000 is smaller proportionately in Latin America than in high-performing Asian countries. Whereas 87 percent of publicly listed companies of this size in our benchmark countries have crossed the $100 million threshold since 2000, the proportion is less than 60 percent in Brazil and Mexico. Colombia’s much smaller corporate sector has been more vibrant, with 81 percent of firms crossing that threshold since 2000.

首先,自2000年以来,收入超过1亿美元的上市公司在拉丁美洲的数量,按比例来说要少于在表现良好的亚洲国家。自2000年以来,在我们的基准国家,这类规模的上市公司中有87%已经超过了1亿美元的门槛,而在巴西和墨西哥,这一比例不到60%。哥伦比亚规模小得多的企业部门则更为活跃,自2000年以来,81%的企业跨过了这一门槛。

Second is the degree of turnover at the top of the rankings. Top quintile of companies with more than $500 million in revenue in the best-performing emerging economies have a hard time getting to the top and staying there: less than half of top-ranked firms in economic profit—that is, returns above the cost of capital—in one cycle were still at the top in the next cycle. In Latin America, we see a distinction between Mexico, where two-thirds of the top quintile firms in terms of economic profit remained in place over the past 15 years, whereas in Brazil, only one-third did, indicating a more vibrant market. Other economies in the region tend toward the average of our benchmarks.

其次是排名靠前的员工流动率。顶层家庭收入超过5亿美元的公司表现最好的新兴经济体很难到达顶部和呆在那里:不到一半的顶级公司的经济利润,收益高于成本的资本金,顶部一个周期仍在接下来的周期。在拉丁美洲,我们看到了墨西哥的不同之处,在过去15年里,按经济利润计算,排名前五分之二的公司中,有三分之二的公司仍然存在,而在巴西,只有三分之一的公司存在,这表明市场更加活跃。该地区的其他经济体趋向于我们基准的平均水平。

Third, these dynamics have correlated with concentrated gains in some cases. Some recent research shows that Latin American firms have been able to command larger and more stable markups on their products, dating to the 1980s. That was even before the rise of the “superstar” phenomenon among large global firms that are capturing an ever-larger share of profits and pulling away from their peers. We also find that midsize and large firms’ profit margins in our three countries are higher across most sectors since 2000 than in our benchmarks. The variation in economic profit is also higher: the top quintile economic profit is higher and the lowest quintile economic profit is lower (more negative) than in the benchmark economies. Trade protection, a legacy of earlier import substitution policies, also continues to contribute to high consumer prices in a number of industries.

第三,在某些情况下,这些动态与集中收益相关。最近的一些研究表明,拉丁美洲的公司能够在他们的产品上获得更大、更稳定的加价,这可以追溯到20世纪80年代。这甚至发生在“超级明星”现象在全球大公司中兴起之前,这些公司正在攫取越来越大的利润份额,并与同行拉开距离。我们还发现,自2000年以来,我们三国大多数行业的大中型企业利润率都高于我们的基准水平。经济利润的差异也更大:最高的五分之一的经济利润更高,最低的五分之一的经济利润比基准经济体更低(更负)。贸易保护是早期进口替代政策的遗赠,它也继续造成若干工业的高消费价格。

The causes of this firm distribution and dynamics are rooted in common legacies of import substitution that favored a few private licenses or large state-run firms in many sectors. Other reasons are differing ways in which state companies were privatized and, especially in Brazil’s case, tax and compliance-heavy regulation that favors either large scale or informality. Unequal access to finance, weak infrastructure, and high input costs also squeeze the middle. The result is a weak level of innovation and specialization needed for future growth. Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico rank below their development level on innovation indices; they have one-quarter to one-third of the digital diffusion of the United States, for example. Research and development investment in the region is relatively low, at just 0.3 percent and 0.5 percent of GDP for Colombia and Mexico, respectively, although it reaches 1.2 percent for Brazil. This compares with about 1 percent for benchmarks.

这种企业分布和活力的根源在于进口替代的共同遗产,即少数私营许可证或许多行业的大型国有企业获得了进口替代的好处。其他原因还包括国有企业私有化的方式不同,尤其是在巴西,税收和偏重合规的监管既有利于大规模经营,也有利于非正式经营。不平等的融资渠道、薄弱的基础设施和高昂的投入成本也挤压了中产阶级。其结果是,未来增长所需的创新和专业化水平较低。巴西、哥伦比亚和墨西哥的创新指数低于各自的发展水平;例如,他们拥有美国四分之一到三分之一的数字传播。该地区的研发投资相对较低,哥伦比亚和墨西哥的研发投资仅占GDP的0.3%和0.5%,而巴西的研发投资占GDP的1.2%。相比之下,基准测试的这一比例约为1%。

Much of Latin America’s labor force is trapped in a long tail of small, unproductive, and often informal firms

拉丁美洲的大部分劳动力都被困在一长串小型、低效且通常是非正规的公司之中

The other side of this dual economy is a multitude of small companies, many of which operate outside the formal economy (as do some midsize and even large firms). These small companies tend to have low productivity and absorb a significant proportion of low-skill workers. They are most concentrated in sectors like retail, construction, and agriculture. Brazil has had the most success in reducing the level of informality in the overall labor force: the rate fell below 50 percent in 2015–16. Mexico and Colombia have much higher rates, of 57 percent and 62 percent, respectively, according to household surveys in each country.

这种双重经济的另一面是大量的小公司,其中许多在正规经济之外运作(一些中型甚至大型公司也是如此)。这些小公司往往生产率低,吸收了相当比例的低技能工人。它们主要集中在零售、建筑和农业等行业。巴西在降低总体劳动力非正式程度方面取得了最大的成功:2015年至2016年,这一比例降至50%以下。墨西哥和哥伦比亚的这一比例要高得多,分别为57%和62%。

In Mexico, for example, small retailers employ two-thirds of the sector’s workforce, or 6.6 million workers, but value added per worker is only about one-seventh that of large and more efficient retailers.

例如,在墨西哥,小型零售商雇佣了该行业三分之二的劳动力,即660万名工人,但每名工人的增加值仅为大型高效零售商的七分之一左右。

Retail highlights how the long tail of small companies drags down overall productivity. In Mexico, for example, small retailers employ two-thirds of the sector’s workforce, or 6.6 million workers, but value added per worker is only about one-seventh that of large and more efficient retailers.

零售业凸显出小企业的长尾效应是如何拖累整体生产率的。例如,在墨西哥,小型零售商雇佣了该行业三分之二的劳动力,即660万名工人,但每名工人的增加值仅为大型高效零售商的七分之一左右。

To increase our understanding of the long tail of small businesses and its resistance to change, we conducted a survey of 3,000 workers—informal, formal, and self-employed—in Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico. It suggests that a majority of workers see self-employment as the main fallback option when wage employment is not available: 70 percent of respondents said temporary or informal self-employment was a viable option in a time of financial uncertainty. Such uncertainty is high, with 28 percent of all workers saying they expected to leave their job in the next 12 months.

为了加深我们对小企业的长尾效应及其对变革的抵制的理解,我们对巴西、哥伦比亚和墨西哥的3000名员工进行了调查,包括非正式员工、正式员工和自营员工。调查显示,大多数员工认为,在没有带薪工作的情况下,自主创业是主要的退路:70%的受访者表示,在金融不稳定时期,临时或非正式的自主创业是一个可行的选择。这种不确定性很高,28%的员工表示,他们希望在未来12个月内离职。

The survey also highlights the constraints of small business. Some 28 percent of the sample were self-employed, of which about half were formal businesses. Only one in four of respondents indicated that they had access to the credit needed to expand their businesses—but two in three said they would like to expand if they could.

调查还强调了小企业面临的限制。约28%的样本是个体经营者,其中约一半是正规企业。只有四分之一的受访者表示,他们能够获得扩大业务所需的信贷,但三分之二的受访者表示,如果可能,他们愿意扩大业务。

The other missing middle is a cohort of upwardly mobile consumers whose rising disposable income helps drive economic demand and investment on a sustainable basis. As noted, many of those lifted out of poverty remain vulnerable and have not reached a comfortable middle-class existence. For this cohort, the main path to sustained and rising prosperity comes from access to productive, well-paid jobs—which have been too scarce to meet the needs of the rapidly expanding labor force in the region. As the supply-side challenge of a missing middle of companies has constrained the expansion of attractive jobs with higher wages and opportunities to build skills, it has contributed to the demand-side challenge of a missing cohort of middle-class consumers with sufficient income to sustain robust domestic demand. The sluggish demand acts as a serious drag on the economy. It limits the growth of markets for domestic businesses that constitute the majority of jobs in a modern economy. It also holds back the development and provision of more complex goods and services, which in turn could strengthen the economy by encouraging investment.

另一个缺失的中产阶层是一群向上流动的消费者,他们不断增长的可支配收入有助于在可持续的基础上推动经济需求和投资。如前所述,许多脱离贫困的人仍然很脆弱,没有过上舒适的中产阶级生活。对这群人来说,实现持续和日益繁荣的主要途径是获得生产性、高收入的工作——这些工作太过稀缺,无法满足该地区迅速增长的劳动力的需求。由于缺少中间阶层的企业所面临的供给侧挑战,限制了有吸引力的工作岗位的扩张,这些岗位的工资水平更高,也提供了培养技能的机会,这也加剧了缺少一批收入足以维持强劲内需的中产阶级消费者所面临的需求侧挑战。需求疲软严重拖累了经济。它限制了构成现代经济中大多数就业岗位的国内企业的市场增长。它还阻碍开发和提供更复杂的商品和服务,而这些商品和服务反过来又可以通过鼓励投资来加强经济。

The growth patterns providing the context for this missing middle differ among our focus countries. In Brazil, the commodity boom led to rising wages and helped draw workers from small-scale agriculture to low-skill jobs in small establishments with below-average productivity. In Mexico, by contrast, wage growth has been strikingly weak and at times negative, even in expanding, high-productivity sectors such as automotive.

为这一缺失的中间阶层提供背景的增长模式在我们的重点国家之间有所不同。在巴西,大宗商品繁荣导致工资上涨,并帮助吸引工人从小规模农业转向生产率低于平均水平的小型企业的低技能工作。相比之下,墨西哥的工资增长一直非常疲弱,有时甚至出现负增长,即便是在汽车等不断扩张的高生产率行业也是如此。

Consumption has grown with expanding population, exports are not filling the demand gap, and both investment and savings are relatively low

消费随着人口增长而增长,出口无法填补需求缺口,投资和储蓄都相对较低

Household consumption represents the biggest share of GDP expenditure in any economy and 64 percent in Latin America, yet it has expanded only slowly, contributing 1.9 percent to GDP growth compared to 2.7 percent in our emerging-market benchmarks. Furthermore, compared to benchmarks, a higher proportion of the consumption growth that has occurred in Latin America has come from expanding population rather than rising per capita consumption. Since the turn of the millennium, per capita consumption growth in Latin America has been just 1.8 percent, less than half the 4.3 percent in benchmark countries. Colombia is high for the region, with per capita consumption growth since 2000 of 2.8 percent, while Chile and Peru are outliers at 3.7 and 4.2 percent respectively. In Mexico, the reverse is true: per capita consumption growth accounted for less than the population growth’s contribution, consistent with low wage growth. This matters because consumption patterns change as incomes rise, with markets for more complex goods and services growing to provide new growth opportunities for business.

在所有经济体中,家庭消费在GDP支出中所占比例最大,在拉丁美洲为64%。然而,家庭消费仅缓慢增长,对GDP增长的贡献为1.9%,而我们的新兴市场基准为2.7%。此外,与基准相比,拉丁美洲消费增长的更大比例来自于人口的增长,而不是人均消费的增长。自世纪之交以来,拉美的人均消费增长仅为1.8%,不到基准国家4.3%的一半。哥伦比亚是该地区的高消费国家,自2000年以来人均消费增长2.8%,智利和秘鲁则分别为3.7%和4.2%。在墨西哥,情况正好相反:人均消费增长所占比重低于人口增长的贡献,与低工资增长相符。这一点很重要,因为随着收入的增长,消费模式也会发生变化,更为复杂的商品和服务的市场会增长,为企业提供新的增长机会。

A higher proportion of the consumption growth that has occurred in Latin America has come from expanding population rather than rising per capita consumption.

拉丁美洲消费增长的更大比例来自于人口的增长,而不是人均消费的增长。

The purchasing power of Latin American consumers is further taxed by the high cost of many consumer goods. Trade barriers continue to raise local prices above global ones, including for basic goods such as food. Similarly, taxes can limit the purchasing power of those most ready to spend. In Brazil, value-added tax represents 40 percent of the total tax burden, compared with 32 percent of the tax burden in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries on average. Taxes on cars approach 50 percent of the cost to consumers. Counting all taxes, the lowest decile ends up paying 32 percent of income in taxes, compared with 23 percent for the middle decile and 21 percent for the top decile.

许多消费品的高成本进一步提高了拉丁美洲消费者的购买力。贸易壁垒继续使当地价格高于全球价格,包括食品等基本商品的价格。同样,税收也会限制那些最愿意消费的人的购买力。在巴西,增值税占总税收负担的40%,而经济合作与发展组织(OECD)国家的平均税收负担为32%。汽车税接近消费者成本的50%。把所有的税都计算在内,收入最低的十分之一的人最终要缴纳32%的所得税,而收入中等的十分之一的人要缴纳23%的所得税,收入最高的十分之一的人要缴纳21%的所得税。

The difficulty in obtaining consumer credit and underdeveloped digital services in finance and retail compound the plight of the vulnerable. Financial inclusion is limited, with less than 50 percent of people in Mexico and Colombia having access to bank accounts. This restricts the ability of households to make the most of their incomes by borrowing and saving. Only 6 percent of sales in Brazil in 2017 took place online, for example, about the same proportion as in India and Indonesia, but substantially lower than in China (16 percent) and South Korea (13 percent). However, digital disruption is starting to appear. In Colombia, notably, a startup called Rappi is providing on-demand delivery of items such as groceries and medication and has become one of Latin America’s first “unicorns”—a startup with a valuation of at least $1 billion. The Argentine digital marketplace MercadoLibre is also gaining ground and spreading across the region.

消费信贷难以获得,金融和零售领域的数字服务不发达,这些都加剧了弱势群体的困境。金融包容性是有限的,墨西哥和哥伦比亚只有不到50%的人有银行账户。这限制了家庭通过借贷和储蓄充分利用收入的能力。例如,2017年巴西只有6%的销售发生在网上,与印度和印度尼西亚的比例大致相同,但大大低于中国(16%)和韩国(13%)。然而,数字颠覆正开始出现。值得注意的是,在哥伦比亚,一家名为Rappi的初创公司正在提供食品杂货和药品等按需配送服务,并已成为拉美首批“独角兽”之一,该公司估值至少为10亿美元。阿根廷数字市场“自由市场”(MercadoLibre)也在扩大地盘,并在整个地区蔓延。

Exports could help fill this demand gap, providing the incentives and markets that companies in Latin America need to invest and broaden their production. However, with the notable exception of Mexico, exports play a smaller role than in the other emerging economies we use as benchmarks; exports in the region account for just 22 percent of GDP compared with 36 percent in the benchmark countries. Mexico has achieved a much stronger export performance since the establishment of NAFTA. Its exports of goods and services rose from 25 percent of GDP in 2000 to 38 percent in 2017. However, the benefits of its export growth have not spilled over into the domestic economy more broadly.

出口可以帮助填补这一需求缺口,为拉美企业提供投资和扩大生产所需的激励和市场。然而,除了墨西哥以外,出口在我们用作基准的其它新兴经济体中所发挥的作用较小;该地区的出口仅占GDP的22%,而基准国家的出口占GDP的36%。自北美自由贸易协定建立以来,墨西哥的出口表现强劲得多。中国的商品和服务出口占GDP的比重从2000年的25%上升到2017年的38%。然而,中国出口增长的好处并未更广泛地波及到国内经济。

Expectations of future demand are a main reason for companies to invest in larger and better production capabilities. With limited access to export markets and slowly growing domestic demand, Latin American economies have maintained rates of investment below those of their peer economies. Latin American and Caribbean investment in 2016 amounted to 19 percent of GDP, below the global average of 24 percent and the investment rate among East Asian emerging countries of 41 percent. Of our three focus countries, only Colombia reached the global average, recording a rapid rise, from 13 to 24 percent between 1999 and 2015, before dipping.

对未来需求的预期是企业投资于更大、更好的生产能力的主要原因。由于进入出口市场的机会有限,国内需求缓慢增长,拉丁美洲各经济体的投资率一直低于其同类经济体。2016年,拉美和加勒比地区投资占国内生产总值(GDP)的19%,低于全球24%的平均水平,也低于东亚新兴国家41%的投资率。在我们的三个重点国家中,只有哥伦比亚达到了全球平均水平,并实现了快速增长,从1999年至2015年间的13%升至24%,之后才有所下降。

In the Mexican auto sector, labor income gains have come from added workers at a wage level that is 1.6 times the national average, yet the average wage of Mexican autoworkers declined in the same period.

在墨西哥汽车行业,劳动力收入的增长来自工人的增加,工资水平是全国平均水平的1.6倍,但墨西哥汽车工人的平均工资同期有所下降。

Income is not flowing through to expanded domestic consumption for different reasons: A comparison of Brazil and Mexico

收入没有流入扩大的国内消费,原因各不相同:比较巴西和墨西哥

The flow of income to expanding domestic consumption can slow for different reasons. Brazil and Mexico provide two examples. In Brazil, social policies, minimum wage increases, and a credit expansion during the commodity-cycle upswing all gave a boost to the domestic market—but it was not sustained. Employed labor income accounted for 57 percent of gross income growth, due mostly to expansion of low-skill retail and other services. The demand boom was not matched by supply-side reforms to raise productivity, however. Moreover, high consumer prices and expensive credit continued to tax the purchasing power even of those with rising incomes. The benefits faded away through inflation and macroeconomic instability once the commodity boom ended. The demand boom was thus unsustainable because it was not supported by supply-side initiatives or a macro environment conducive to private investment.

由于不同的原因,收入流向扩大国内消费的速度可能会放缓。巴西和墨西哥提供了两个例子。在巴西,社会政策、最低工资的提高以及大宗商品周期上涨期间的信贷扩张都提振了国内市场,但这些都没有持续下去。就业劳动收入占总收入增长的57%,主要是由于低技能零售业和其他服务业的扩张。然而,需求激增与提高生产率的供给侧改革并不匹配。此外,高消费价格和昂贵的信贷继续对购买力征税,即使对那些收入不断增加的人也是如此。一旦大宗商品繁荣结束,这些好处就会随着通胀和宏观经济的不稳定而消失。因此,需求繁荣是不可持续的,因为它没有得到供应方面的举措或有利于私人投资的宏观环境的支持。

Mexico, by contrast, focused on supply reforms and access to external markets, boosting productivity among the large modern segments of many industries by as much as 5.6 percent in the 2000s.

相比之下,墨西哥专注于供应改革和进入外部市场,在本世纪头10年,许多产业的大型现代化部门的生产率提高了5.6%。

Mexico, by contrast, focused on supply reforms and access to external markets, boosting productivity among the large modern segments of many industries by as much as 5.6 percent in the 2000s. Yet domestic demand has lagged. Productivity in the long tail of small industries did not improve and, unlike in Brazil, the gains did not feed through into broad-based wage growth; rather, they accrued mainly to the profit share of income. For example, while manufacturing productivity increased by an average of 1.7 percent annually between 2005 and 2015, average wages were stagnant. Given that a higher share of wage income is spent (rather than saved), this limited the multiplier potential of the productivity gains to translate into a more sustained source of domestic demand expansion. Domestic market growth was thus limited, crimping incentives for investment. The middle lost out amid these changes.

相比之下,墨西哥专注于供应改革和进入外部市场,在本世纪头10年,许多产业的大型现代化部门的生产率提高了5.6%。然而,国内需求却落后了。小型工业的长尾生产率并没有提高,而且与巴西不同,这种增长没有体现在广泛的工资增长中;相反,它们主要是按利润在收入中所占的比例计算的。例如,2005年至2015年,制造业生产率平均每年增长1.7%,而平均工资却停滞不前。考虑到工资收入中较高的部分用于消费(而非储蓄),这限制了生产率增长的乘数潜力,无法转化为更持久的内需扩张来源。因此,国内市场增长有限,抑制了投资激励。中产阶级在这些变化中迷失了方向。

The Mexican auto sector provides one striking example of the divergence between productivity growth and wages. Production has grown at an annual average rate of 7 percent since 2006, and after doubling in a decade, labor productivity now ranks with that of the top producers in the world. Labor income gains have come from added workers at a wage level that is 1.6 times the national average, yet the average wage of Mexican autoworkers declined in the same period. By comparison, South Korea at the same point in its auto industry development saw a 58 percent increase in sector wages over the corresponding ten years of productivity growth.

墨西哥汽车业是生产率增长与工资差距的一个显著例子。自2006年以来,生产以每年7%的平均速度增长,在十年内翻了一番之后,劳动生产率现在已跻身世界顶级生产商之列。劳动收入的增加来自工人的工资水平是全国平均水平的1.6倍,而同期墨西哥汽车工人的平均工资有所下降。相比之下,韩国在汽车工业发展的同一时期,其工业部门的工资增长了58%。

In Colombia, the patterns of growth since the turn of the century have been more inclusive. Wage growth averaged more than 2 percent annually, exceeding productivity growth and reflecting productivity gains across sectors. Some six million workers joined the workforce between 2000 and 2015, with disproportionate gains for women. However, this rapid expansion slowed wage growth compared with some peers. For example, Thailand grew at about the same rate during this period but nonetheless achieved wage growth of 3.7 percent, almost double that of Colombia, thanks to substantial productivity gains.

在哥伦比亚,自世纪之交以来的增长模式更具包容性。工资平均每年增长超过2%,超过了生产率的增长,反映了各个部门的生产率增长。2000年至2015年间,约有600万工人加入劳动大军,其中女性获得了不成比例的增长。然而,与一些同行相比,这种快速扩张减缓了工资增长。例如,泰国在此期间的经济增长速度与美国大致相同,但由于生产率的大幅提高,泰国的工资增长了3.7%,几乎是哥伦比亚的两倍。

If Latin American economies were able to fill in and strengthen the missing middles, thereby establishing a virtuous cycle of inclusive growth, the potential reward would be substantial. Using a macroeconomic simulation that assumes conservative growth in productivity is matched by increased labor shares and consumption in line with more inclusive countries, we find that achieving such a growth cycle could lift GDP in the region in 2030 by 50 percent above a baseline scenario that factors in current trends, including reduced labor force expansion. That would amount to an increase per person of more than $1,000 per year, or a $1 trillion incremental boost to GDP in 2030. Obtaining that prize will be challenging. Governments and business leaders will need to embrace a growth-focused policy agenda that addresses the missing links of past reforms.

如果拉美经济体能够填补和加强缺失的中间环节,从而建立一个包容性增长的良性循环,潜在的回报将是可观的。使用宏观经济模拟假定保守的生产率增长匹配通过增加劳动力股票和消费符合更具包容性的国家,我们发现实现这样一个生长周期可以提升该地区的GDP在2030年由50%以上一个基线场景因素在目前的趋势,包括减少劳动力扩张。这将意味着人均每年增加1000多美元,或到2030年GDP增加1万亿美元。获得那个奖将是一项挑战。各国政府和企业领导人将需要制定以增长为重点的政策议程,解决过去改革中缺失的环节。

Even in a time of social and political tensions, Latin America has a new opportunity to revitalize inclusive growth—and new tools to achieve it: digital technologies that can raise productivity growth and develop the missing middles, if embraced and adopted at scale. Digital entrepreneurship is already on the rise, with new platforms and applications from e-commerce to digital finance springing up across the region; several digital startups have achieved valuations of $1 billion valuation or more.

即使在社会和政治紧张时期,拉丁美洲也有新的机会重振包容性增长——以及实现包容性增长的新工具:数字技术,如果得到广泛接受和采用,可以提高生产率增长,并发展缺失的中间产业。数字创业正在兴起,从电子商务到数字金融的新平台和新应用在该地区如雨后春笋般涌现;几家数字初创公司的估值达到了10亿美元甚至更多。

Digital technologies can help directly address some of Latin America’s challenges around the missing middles. While not a “silver bullet” or cure-all, the technologies can make it easier for companies to open businesses, register property, and file taxes over the internet, reducing the cost of red tape. Digital can facilitate more efficient markets from land and jobs to local services. Digital platforms make it possible for small and mid size companies to become “micromultinationals” able to compete with much larger competitors by offering their goods and services through online marketplaces regionally or globally. Critically, digital can and is already creating new, more productive jobs in Latin America—and the potential productivity boost it could give to the region’s economies as a whole could offset the drag from its changing demographics. At the same time, these technologies present potential risks for inclusive growth in terms of job displacement and further concentration of profits.

数字技术可以帮助直接解决拉丁美洲围绕缺失的中产阶级所面临的一些挑战。虽然这些技术不是“灵丹妙药”或万灵药,但它们可以让企业更容易地在互联网上开展业务、登记财产和报税,从而降低繁文缛节的成本。数字化可以促进从土地、就业到地方服务等更有效的市场。数字平台使中小型企业有可能成为“微型跨国公司”,通过在地区或全球范围内的在线市场提供商品和服务,与规模大得多的竞争对手竞争。至关重要的是,数字技术能够而且已经在拉丁美洲创造新的、更有生产力的工作岗位——它可能给整个地区经济带来的潜在生产力提升,可以抵消其不断变化的人口结构带来的拖累。与此同时,这些技术在就业岗位转移和利润进一步集中方面为包容性增长带来了潜在风险。

Three priorities will be needed to lay the foundations for a pro-growth, inclusive agenda for the region and make it better able to embrace digital disruption.

要为该地区促进增长和包容性的议程奠定基础,使其更好地接受数字颠覆,需要优先考虑三个方面。

First is the need to create a competitive business environment in which digital can thrive, innovation is rewarded, and opportunities are created for all, especially squeezed firms in the middle. That will mean using digital tools where available to cut red tape, improve access to finance, and reduce barriers to entry and growth that reduce dynamism and performance pressure. Second, regulation will need to be redesigned to create labor and consumer markets that spread productivity gains to the vulnerable and middle classes. If Latin America is to boost prosperity for all, productivity gains must flow to rising incomes for workers as they increase in skill level and to firms well placed to reinvest in their people, technology, and communities. Third, government itself can leverage digital platforms to raise public-sector efficiency and improve the delivery and cost of public services. Institutions will need to adapt and shift focus from protecting and regulating the status quo to encouraging new investment and experimenting with new delivery solutions.

首先,我们需要创造一个竞争激烈的商业环境,在这个环境中,数字技术能够蓬勃发展,创新能够得到回报,所有人都能创造机会,尤其是处于中间的那些受到挤压的公司。这将意味着利用现有的数字工具,减少繁文缛节,改善融资渠道,降低进入和增长的壁垒,从而降低活力和业绩压力。其次,监管需要重新设计,以创造劳动力和消费市场,将生产率的提高惠及弱势群体和中产阶级。如果拉丁美洲要促进所有人的繁荣,生产力的提高就必须流向工人收入的增加,因为他们的技术水平提高了,流向那些处于有利地位的公司,以便对他们的人民、技术和社区进行再投资。第三,政府本身可以利用数字平台提高公共部门的效率,改善公共服务的提供和成本。各机构将需要调整并将重点从保护和调节现状转向鼓励新的投资和试验新的交付解决方案。

Institutions will need to adapt and shift focus from protecting and regulating the status quo to encouraging new investment and experimenting with new delivery solutions.

各机构将需要调整并将重点从保护和调节现状转向鼓励新的投资和试验新的交付解决方案。

Such changes will make Latin America better able to harness digital technologies, which could serve as a powerful source of productivity and growth. Many countries in Latin America have already started on this path; if that energy can be maintained and built out, the region may be ripe for a Digital Spring. While the changes may be led by digital companies and technologies, they will extend to non-digital parts of the economy, too. Disruption from digital and in the broader economy offers an opportunity for a new model of inclusive growth in which governments facilitate new sources of productivity for firms and workers and design policies to share benefits with all citizens.

这些变化将使拉丁美洲更好地利用数字技术,而数字技术可以成为生产力和增长的强大源泉。许多拉丁美洲国家已经开始走上这条道路;如果这种能量能够得到维持和发展,那么该地区就有可能迎来数字化的春天。虽然这些变化可能由数字公司和技术引领,但它们也将扩展到经济的非数字领域。数字化和更广泛经济的颠覆为一种新的包容性增长模式提供了机遇,在这种模式下,政府为企业和工人提供新的生产力来源,并制定政策,与所有公民共享福利。

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