India in 2024: Narendra Modi once more, but to what end?

2024年的印度:Modi再次当选,但这一次会怎样?

2019/05/17 20:28
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对照中文英文原文
即使在最近的经济放缓的情况下,印度仍然拥有2018年亚洲增长最快的经济体。但在令人印象深刻的GDP扩张之下,对印度经济模式的不安显然会缓和热情。

Even with the recent economic slowdown, India still boasts Asia’s fastest growing economy in 2018. But beneath the veneer of impressive GDP expansion, uneasiness about India’s economic model clearly tempers enthusiasm.

即使在最近的经济放缓的情况下,印度仍然拥有2018年亚洲增长最快的经济体。但在令人印象深刻的GDP扩张之下,对印度经济模式的不安显然会缓和热情。

Indians are widely expected to decide to continue the country’s current economic development path under the leadership of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).[1] Even with the recent economic slowdown, India still boasts Asia’s fastest growing economy in 2018. But beneath the veneer of impressive GDP expansion, uneasiness about India’s economic model clearly tempers enthusiasm. There is no doubt that the slowdown of India economy casts shadow on Narendra Modi’s second term and whether this time it will be different.

人们普遍预计印度人将决定在印度人民党(BJP)的领导下继续推行该国目前的经济发展道路。[1]即使在最近的经济放缓的情况下,印度仍然拥有2018年亚洲增长最快的经济体。但在令人印象深刻的GDP扩张之下,对印度经济模式的不安显然会缓和热情。毫无疑问,印度经济的放缓给Narendra Modi的第二任期带来了影响,这次是否会有所不同。

Growth is particularly important to India not only because of its need to converge given low GDP per capita but also huge pressure on job creation on the back of its rapidly growing population. In fact, India struggles to generate enough formal jobs and lacks capital to invest in infrastructure to absorb existing excess supply for labour, let alone the rapidly rising population.

增长对印度尤其重要,不仅因为人均国内生产总值较低,而且由于人口快速增长,创造就业机会的压力也很大。事实上,印度努力创造足够的正规就业机会,缺乏资金来投资基础设施,以吸收现有的劳动力供应过剩,更不用说快速增长的人口。

To assess what is at stake in Modi’s second term, we analyse India from two perspectives: a) the progress the Modi government has made thus far on key pillars of his pledges since coming to power in 2014; b) the scale of reforms that is needed for India to reach its potential. For the latter, we use China as a comparison based on similar population size and, possibly, even global ambition in many ways.

为了评估莫迪第二任期的利害关系,我们从两个方面分析了印度:a)莫迪政府迄今为止在自2014年上台以来履行其承诺的关键支柱方面取得的进展; b)印度发挥其潜力所需的改革规模。对于后者,我们将中国作为基于相似人口规模的比较,甚至可能在很多方面实现全球野心。

First, Modi has made progress but far from enough when compared to what India needs. We analysed Modi’s pledges within the framework of the Solow growth model, which looks at three factors of output/production: labour, capital and productivity (soft infrastructure reforms). India does not have a supply of labour challenge like those in East Asia, as its working age population is expected to expand rapidly so much so that it needs to create millions of jobs per year in the next decade to absorb the incoming labour (Chart 1). Beyond the employment needs, India struggles on total factor productivity, which requires capital to absorb existing and incoming labour into more productive sectors as well as reforms to reduce red tape. This requires reforms on all three aspects of the Solow growth model to escape from its current low middle-income trap.

首先,与印度的需求相比,莫迪取得了进展,但远远不够。我们分析了莫迪在Solow增长模型框架内的承诺,该模型着眼于产出/生产的三个因素:劳动力,资本和生产力(软基础设施改革)。印度没有像东亚那样的劳动力供给挑战,因为其工作年龄人口预计将迅速扩大,因此需要在未来十年内每年创造数百万个工作岗位以吸收新工人(图1) )。除了就业需求之外,印度还在全要素生产率方面进行斗争,这要求资本将现有和即将到来的劳动力吸收到更具生产力的部门以及改革以减少繁文缛节。这需要对Solow增长模型的所有三个方面进行改革,以摆脱目前的低中等收入陷阱。

Currently, India has a low labour participation rate, especially compared with China (Chart 2). Worse still, within the Indian employment population, the vast majority is still stuck in informal sectors, which equates to low total factor productivity. For China, informal employment takes up significantly less proportion of the total. The situation can only get worse for India unless many more formal jobs are created.

目前,印度的劳动参与率较低,特别是与中国相比(图2)。更糟糕的是,在印度就业人口中,绝大多数仍然停留在非正规部门,这相当于低全要素生产率。对中国而言,非正规就业占总数的比例要小得多。除非创造更多正式职位,否则印度的情况只会变得更糟。


These challenges are well understood within the academic and political circle of India and have been sources of how to address the ills of India’s under-performance despite great demographic potential. Modi and his BJP have made pledges on the key challenges of the economy.

这些挑战在印度的学术界和政界内得到了充分的理解,并且尽管具有巨大的人口潜力,但仍然是如何解决印度表现不佳的弊端的来源。莫迪和他的人民党已经承诺了经济的主要挑战。

First, let’s start with the positive progress Modi has made since 2014 – most of which are pertaining to capital while he underperforms on his labour and productivity promises. Capital is obviously important as the infrastructure deficit is a clear bottleneck to create more jobs. Regarding capital, there are two obvious ways to increase it: Foreign capital and public investment. As for the former, Modi has tried to liberalise both FDI and portfolio with mixed results.  Within his Make in India campaign, a few measures to open up some sectors to foreign competition have been taken, which has helped increase FDI into India (Chart 6). That said, it is still significantly less than what is really needed to increase demand for workers, particularly in the manufacturing sector which only comprises of a small percentage of GDP even compared to China’s in the early 2000s (Chart 11).

首先,让我们从莫迪自2014年以来取得的积极进展开始 - 其中大部分与资本有关,而他的劳动力和生产力承诺表现不佳。资本显然很重要,因为基础设施赤字是创造更多就业机会的明显瓶颈。关于资本,有两种明显的方法可以增加资本:外国资本和公共投资。至于前者,莫迪试图放开外国直接投资和投资组合,结果好坏参半。在他的印度制造运动中,已经采取了一些措施来开放一些部门进行外国竞争,这有助于增加对印度的外国直接投资(图6)。也就是说,它仍远远低于增加工人需求所需的实际需求,特别是制造业,即使与中国在21世纪初相比,其仅占GDP的一小部分(图11)。

Moreover, Modi has backtracked some of his reforms, particularly for the opening up of e-commerce as it draws backlash from small and medium retailers and they are a large part of the voting populace. For example, the recently announced e-commerce rule to cap the inventory sourcing of online retailers from a same supplier – many of them are stake holders of these online retailers, has hurt Amazon at the benefit of domestic players and raised questions about the commitment and consistency of foreign investment policy in India.

此外,莫迪已经取消了他的一些改革,尤其是开放电子商务,因为它引起了中小零售商的强烈反对,他们是投票民众的很大一部分。例如,最近公布的电子商务规则限制了同一供应商的在线零售商的库存采购 - 其中许多是这些在线零售商的利益相关者,在国内企业的利益下损害了亚马逊,并对此承诺提出了质疑。印度外国投资政策的一致性。

In addition to a relatively shallow opening up to inward FDI, his government has also further liberalised portfolio investment. In particular, the quota for foreign investment in Indian government bonds is gradually lifted.

除了对外国直接投资的相对浅薄的开放外,他的政府还进一步放开了投资组合。特别是,印度政府债券的外国投资配额逐步取消。

As regards the public investment, Modi has tried to increase the tax base, by introducing goods and services taxes (GST), which aims to harmonize existing taxes with much more simplified codes. This has resulted in the improving rank of paying taxes in ease of doing business for India (Chart 3 and Chart 4).

关于公共投资,莫迪试图通过引入商品和服务税(GST)来增加税基,该税旨在通过更简化的法规来协调现有税收。这导致了为印度做生意而增加纳税的等级(图3和图4)。


On the management of capital, particularly banking sector reform, the Modi government passed the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code to provide a clear framework for the path of the recovery of debts. That said, non-performing loan (NLP) ratio remains high for public banks. Modi also demonetised the economy in hope to track down and bring back black money stashed in foreign banks and offshore accounts. This removed the majority of currency from the system but faced backlashed in that it disproportionately hurt small and medium enterprises and resulted in job losses. Based on data from the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy, both GST and demonetisation caused massive job losses in 2018.

在资本管理,特别是银行业改革方面,莫迪政府通过了“破产和破产法”,为债务追偿提供了一个明确的框架。也就是说,公共银行的不良贷款率(NLP)仍然很高。莫迪还暗示经济希望追查并带回外国银行和离岸账户中的黑钱。这使得大部分货币从系统中剔除,但面临倒退,因为它对中小型企业造成了不成比例的伤害并导致失业。根据印度经济监测中心的数据,商品及服务税和恶魔化导致2018年大量失业。

While Modi has made progress on whatever concerns capital as a factor of production, he has clearly fallen short on both labour and productivity reforms. On the labour side, his government has discontinued a meaningful comprehensive labour data collection, but our estimate is that the Indian economy is far from delivering much-needed jobs for the massive supply of labour. Modi promised 10 million jobs per year but new payroll records from EPFO point to a huge gap of jobs created in 2018 (Chart 5). Moreover, the ILO estimates for informal labour have worsened over the years as the size of vulnerable employment rises to and that’s already on top of half of the working age population being idle.

虽然莫迪在资本作为生产要素的任何关注方面取得了进展,但他显然在劳动力和生产率改革方面都做得不够。在劳工方面,他的政府已经停止了有意义的全面劳动力数据收集,但我们的估计是,印度经济远远没有为大量劳动力提供急需的就业机会。莫迪承诺每年提供1000万个工作岗位,但EPFO的新工资记录显示2018年创造了巨大的就业岗位(图5)。此外,国际劳工组织对非正规劳动力的估计多年来一直在恶化,因为弱势就业人口的规模上升,并且已经处于闲置工作年龄人口的一半之上。


The weakness of the job picture is supported by incorporating FDI inflows into the manufacturing sector. The Make in India slogan primarily attracts services and information & communication technology while not enough is in manufacturing FDI (Chart 6). In other words, this is a drop in the bucket of what is needed for India to become self-sufficient in manufacturing let alone becoming a manufacturing centre of the world. For example, India export a comparable amount in manufacturing goods in 2018 to Vietnam’s, a country significantly smaller in size. It does not help that Modi’s pledge to improve infrastructure is held back by limited public funding and a banking sector saddled with bad loans and dominated by state-owned banks. In fact, the quality of India’s infrastructure has seen little improvement over the past 5 years (Chart 7). Moreover, India’s infrastructure spending has been stuck in low gear since 2014 too (Chart 8).

通过将外国直接投资流入制造业来支持就业形势的弱点。 Make in India的口号主要是吸引服务和信息及通信技术,而制造业FDI则不够(图6)。换句话说,这是印度在制造业中实现自给自足所需要的一滴水,更不用说成为世界制造业中心。例如,印度在2018年将制造业产品的可比数量出口到越南,这个国家规模明显较小。莫迪改善基础设施的承诺受到有限公共资金以及背负不良贷款并由国有银行主导的银行业的阻碍,这无济于事。事实上,印度基础设施的质量在过去5年中几乎没有改善(图7)。此外,印度的基础设施支出自2014年以来一直处于低位(图8)。


One of the key challenges to investment and development in India is restrictive land and labour laws. And Modi promised to repeal the Amend the Land Acquisition Act of 2013, which is a barrier to investment and development, but on August 31, 2015, Modi decided to not go forward with amending the Land Acquisition Act of 2013. Modi also promised to review and amend Labour laws, which is onerous, but has not done so. For example, India requires that any firm employing more than 100 workers must seek and receive government permission before dismissing any worker. Employers therefore hire employees informally to get around this law and as a result, the majority of India’s workforce is informal.

印度投资和发展面临的主要挑战之一是限制性土地和劳动法。 Modi承诺废除2013年修订土地收购法案,这是投资和发展的障碍,但2015年8月31日,Modi决定不再修改2013年的土地征用法案.Modi还承诺审查并修改劳动法,这是繁琐的,但尚未这样做。例如,印度要求任何雇用超过100名工人的公司必须在解雇任何工人之前寻求并获得政府许可。因此,雇主非正式雇用员工以绕过这项法律,因此,印度的大多数劳动力都是非正式的。

In short, while the Modi government has made progress in attracting capital, its pace of progress has been snail-pace in comparison to what is needed to allow India to turn its rising working age population into a demographic dividend. In the next section, we will discuss what is needed for India to do so.

简而言之,虽然莫迪政府在吸引资本方面取得了进展,但与允许印度将其不断上升的劳动年龄人口转变为人口红利所需要的相比,其进步速度一直缓慢。在下一节中,我们将讨论印度需要做什么。


Second, what is needed to take India to the next level: savings and investment. The only country that is comparable to India is China due to their massive sub-continental population size (as well as geographic). For India, the road forward is clear – it needs to raise its capital stock per worker; the debate is how it will do so. China’s experience in the early 2000s may prove to be an important lesson for India. There are two key differentiators between India and China: a) China’s rapid urbanisation of the rural population by moving farmers into factories by attracting FDI in manufacturing to capitalise its labour comparative advantage; b) China’s raising of the savings rate to finance necessary infrastructure projects and to develop sectors needed for industrialisation.

其次,需要将印度提升到一个新的水平:储蓄和投资。与印度相比,唯一的国家是中国,因为它们拥有庞大的次大陆人口规模(以及地理位置)。对于印度来说,前进的道路是明确的 - 它需要增加每个工人的资本存量;辩论是如何做到的。中国在21世纪初的经历可能证明对印度来说是一个重要的教训。印度和中国之间有两个关键的区别:a)中国通过吸引制造业的外国直接投资来利用其劳动力比较优势,将农民转移到工厂,从而实现农村人口的快速城市化; b)中国提高储蓄率,为必要的基础设施项目提供资金,并发展工业化所需的部门。

We discussed in the previous sections that the key challenges to India are well understood, such as labour and land reforms. That said, the scale of progress needed is not often discussed. Although India is the only country that can absorb the labour-intensive manufacturing that is increasingly more uncompetitive in China, it only attracts as much manufacturing FDI as Vietnam, a country a tenth of its size.

我们在前面的章节中讨论过,印度的主要挑战是很好理解的,例如劳工和土地改革。也就是说,不经常讨论所需的进展规模。虽然印度是唯一能够吸收劳动密集型制造业的国家,而这种制造业在中国越来越缺乏竞争力,但它只吸引了与越南这样规模十分之一的越南制造业的外国直接投资。

Currently, India attracts small amounts of manufacturing FDI, which is the same level in the past eight years. If we compare this to China when it joined the WTO in 2001, the level is too low to attract much-needed capital, particularly the kind of capital that demands a lot of workers. As a share of fixed asset investment (FAI), manufacturing FDI in India also lagged behind. As an aggregate, India doesn’t do as badly, but as we mentioned, most are not in much-needed manufacturing. Meaning, India needs to absorb much more capital from the rest of the world than it currently does to boost labour demand in manufacturing.

目前,印度吸引了少量的制造业外国直接投资,这与过去八年的水平相同。如果我们在2001年加入世贸组织时将其与中国进行比较,那么这个水平太低,无法吸引急需的资本,特别是需要大量工人的资本。作为固定资产投资(FAI)的一部分,印度的制造业外国直接投资也落后于其他国家。总的来说,印度并没有那么糟糕,但正如我们所提到的,大多数都不是急需的制造业。意思是,印度需要从世界其他地方吸收更多的资本,而不是目前为提高制造业的劳动力需求。


Beyond using its labour surplus advantage to attract labour-intensive manufacturing, India needs to also increase its savings rate to be able to fund much-needed infrastructure development. Such gap is particularly salient when compared to China in early 2000s. The country’s persistent current account deficit makes it vulnerable to volatile capital flows, another key reason that it needs to attract more FDI and also raise the savings rate. Because of this capital deficit, the Indian government cannot do public-led investment without significantly raising the deficit. The previous administration forcing of state-owned bank to lend to infrastructure firms caused a high increase of NPLs. Since then, the investment on infrastructure has declined. Our assessment of significantly lower investment of India than China’s means there is a lot of scope to increase.

除了利用其劳动力剩余优势吸引劳动密集型制造业外,印度还需要提高储蓄率,以便为急需的基础设施发展提供资金。与中国在21世纪初相比,这种差距尤为突出。该国持续的经常账户赤字使其易受资本流动波动的影响,这是另一个需要吸引更多外国直接投资并提高储蓄率的关键原因。由于这种资本赤字,印度政府不能在不显着增加赤字的情况下进行公共领导的投资。上一届政府强迫国有银行向基础设施公司提供贷款,导致不良贷款大幅增加。从那时起,对基础设施的投资已经下降。我们对印度投资显着低于中国的评估意味着有很大的增长空间。


In short, our analysis of Modi progress report shows that he has made some progress in attracting capital and reforming the banking sector. That said, much of the work is left unfinished as India still does not attract enough FDI in manufacturing to absorb its labour force. Indeed, India needs to attract 2% more of GDP than it current does. This should help it leverage its excess labour supply to absorb much-needed capital from the rest of the world and close the financing gap. Moreover, India needs to also increase its savings rate to boost infrastructure investment. Both require Modi to be much bolder reforms in his second term that is certainly a strong leap from where it is today.

简而言之,我们对莫迪进展报告的分析表明,他在吸引资本和改革银行业方面取得了一些进展。也就是说,由于印度仍然没有吸引足够的外国直接投资来吸收劳动力,因此大部分工作尚未完成。实际上,印度需要吸引的GDP比现在多2%。这应该有助于它利用其过剩的劳动力供应来吸收世界其他地区急需的资本并缩小融资缺口。此外,印度还需要提高储蓄率,以促进基础设施投资。两者都要求莫迪在他的第二个任期内进行更大胆的改革,这肯定是今天的一个强有力的飞跃。

Endnotes

尾注

[1] India has a parliamentary system similar to the UK where the PM is not directly elected and so Modi’s re-election is dependent on his party the BJP.

[1]印度有一个类似于英国的议会制度,其中PM不是直接选举产生的,因此莫迪的连任取决于他的政党BJP。

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