Sustaining Maximum Employment and Price Stability

保持最大就业和价格稳定

2019/06/03 16:35
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对照中文英文原文
美联储副主席Clarida在纽约经济俱乐部的演讲。

In July, the current U.S. economic expansion will become the longest on record—or at least the record since the 1850s, which is as far back as the National Bureau of Economic Research tracks U.S. business cycles.2 In anticipation of that milestone, I would like to take stock of where the U.S. economy is today, to assess its future trajectory, to review some important structural changes in the economy that have occurred over the past decade, and to explore what all of this might mean for U.S. monetary policy.

到今年7月,当前的美国经济扩张将成为历史上最长的记录,鉴于此,我会比较评估美国经济当前的位置、评估其未来发展轨迹、回顾过去十年中发生的一些重要的经济结构变化,并探讨所有这些对美国货币政策可能意味着什么。

The Federal Reserve has a specific mandate assigned to it in statute by the Congress, which is the dual mandate of maximum employment and price stability. As I speak today, the economy is as close to achieving both legs of this dual mandate as it has been in 20 years. My colleagues and I understand that our responsibility is to conduct a monetary policy that not only is supportive of and consistent with achieving maximum employment and price stability, but also, once achieved, is appropriate, nimble, and consistent with sustaining maximum employment and price stability for as long as possible. And thus, the title of my talk today is "Sustaining Maximum Employment and Price Stability."

美联储在国会的法规中被赋予特定的双重使命,即就业最大化和价格稳定。正如我今天所说的那样,经济与20年来双重使命的关系一样接近。我和我的同事明白,我们的责任是实施一项货币政策,不仅支持并与实现最大限度的就业和价格稳定相一致,而且一旦实现,就是适当的,灵活的,并且与维持最大就业和价格稳定相一致尽可能长的。因此,今天我的演讲题目是“维持最大就业和价格稳定”。

Midway through the second quarter of 2019, the U.S. economy is in a good place. Over the past four quarters, gross domestic product (GDP) growth has averaged 3.2 percent, which compares with an average growth rate of 2.3 percent since the recovery began in the summer of 2009. By most estimates, fiscal policy played an important role in boosting growth in 2018, and I expect that fiscal policies will continue to support growth in 2019. Over the same four quarters, the unemployment rate has averaged 3.8 percent, and the most recent reading, at 3.6 percent, is near its lowest level in 50 years. Moreover, average monthly job gains have continued to outpace the increases needed to provide jobs for new entrants to the labor force. Wages have been rising broadly in line with productivity and prices and thus, at present, do not signal rising cost-push pressure. Notwithstanding strong growth and low unemployment, U.S. inflation remains muted—currently, it is somewhat below our 2 percent longer-run objective for the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price deflator—and inflation expectations, according to a variety of measures, continue to be stable.

在2019年第二季度中期,美国经济处于一个好位置。在过去的四个季度中,国内生产总值(GDP)平均增长率为3.2%,而自2009年夏季开始复苏以来的平均增长率为2.3%。财政政策在推动2018年的增长方面发挥了重要作用,预计财政政策将继续支持2019年的增长。在同样的四个季度中,失业率平均为3.8%,最新为3.6%,接近50年来的最低水平。此外,平均每月新增就业继续超过为新进入劳动力市场提供就业机会所需的增长。工资一直在大幅上升,与生产率和价格一致,因此目前并未发出成本推动压力上升的信号。尽管增长强劲且失业率低,但美国通胀仍处于低迷状态 - 目前仍远低于2%的长期目标。

As we look ahead, in our March Summary of Economic Projections, the median projection of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants was for GDP growth of around 2 percent as the modal, or most likely, outcome over the next three years, for PCE inflation to rise to 2 percent, and for the unemployment rate to edge up to 3.9 percent by 2021.

在3月份的经济预测摘要中,联邦公开市场委员会(FOMC)参与者的预测中值为GDP增长约2%,未来三年PCE通货膨胀率上升至2%,失业率将上升至3.9%。

Before I discuss the outlook for monetary policy, allow me to review some important structural changes that have taken place in the economy over the past decade that will be particularly relevant for our monetary policy decisions.

在讨论货币政策前景之前,请允许我回顾一下过去十年经济中发生的一些重要结构性变化,这些变化对我们的货币政策决策尤其重要。

Structural Changes in the U.S. Economy: Demand and Supply

美国经济结构变化:需求与供给

Perhaps the most significant structural change relevant to monetary policy is that the real, or inflation-adjusted, rate of interest consistent with full employment and price stability, often referred to as the neutral rate, or r*, appears to have fallen in the United States and abroad from more than 2 percent before the crisis to less than 1 percent today.3 The decline in neutral policy rates likely reflects several factors, including aging populations, higher private saving, a greater demand for safe assets, and a slowdown in global productivity growth. The policy implications of the decline in neutral rates are important. All else being equal, a lower neutral rate increases the likelihood that a central bank's policy rate will reach its effective lower bound in a future economic downturn. Such a development, in turn, could make it more difficult during a future downturn for monetary policy to provide sufficient accommodation to rapidly return employment and inflation to mandate-consistent levels.4

也许最重要的结构性变化相关货币政策是,在美国和国外,与充分就业和物价稳定一致的实际利率(通常被称为中性利率,或r*),似乎已经从危机前的2%以上下降到目前的不足1%。中性利率的下降可能反映了一些因素,包括人口老龄化、私人储蓄增加、对安全资产的需求增加以及全球生产力增速放缓。中性利率下降的政策影响很重要。在其他条件相同的情况下,较低的中性利率会增加央行政策利率在未来经济衰退中达到其有效下限的可能性。反过来,这种发展可能会使货币政策在未来经济衰退期间更加难以提供足够的宽松,以迅速将就业和通货膨胀恢复到和目标一致的水平。

Another important potential change in the U.S. economy has been the steady decline in estimates of the structural rate of unemployment consistent with "maximum" employment, often referred to as u*. This decline in u* may be due in part to higher educational attainment and a larger proportion of older workers in the workforce today relative to the workforce of past decades.5 If u* is lower than historical estimates suggest, this would imply that, even with today's historically low unemployment rate, the labor market would not be as tight—and inflationary pressures would not be as strong—as one would expect, based on historical estimates of u*. Indeed, I believe the range of plausible estimates for u* may extend to 4 percent or even below.

美国经济的另一个重要潜在变化是与“最大”就业一致的结构失业率(通常被称为u*)稳步下降。这种下降可能部分是由于相对于过去几十年的劳动力,当今劳动力中的教育程度更高,老年工人的比例更高。如果u*低于历史估计值,这就意味着,甚至根据历史上的低失业率,劳动力市场没有那么火热,通胀压力不会像人们预期的那样强劲。实际上,我认为u*的合理估计范围可能会扩大到4%甚至更低。

I also note that the decline in the unemployment rate in recent years has been accompanied by a pronounced increase in labor force participation for individuals in their prime working years.6 It has also been accompanied since 2014 by a rise in labor's share of national income. As I have documented previously, in the past several U.S. business cycles, labor's share has risen as those expansions proceeded because workers command higher wages in a stronger labor market; notably, in those cycles, the rise in labor's share did not pass through to faster price inflation.7 The previously mentioned increase in prime-age labor force participation has provided employers with a source of additional labor input and has been one factor restraining inflationary pressures. Notwithstanding these recent gains, prime-age participation rates remain somewhat below levels achieved in the 1990s and may still have some more room to run. If so, then potential output could be higher than many current estimates suggest.

我还注意到,近年来失业率的下降伴随着个人在其主要工作年龄中劳动力参与率的显着增加。自2014年以来,劳动力在国民收入中的份额也随之增加。正如我之前所记录的那样,在过去的几个美国商业周期中,劳动力的份额随着这些扩张的进行而上升,因为工人在更强大的劳动力市场中获得更高的工资;值得注意的是,在这些周期中,劳动力份额的增加没有通过更快的价格上涨.。前面提到的壮年劳动力参与的增加为雇主提供了额外的劳动力投入来源,并且是抑制通胀压力的一个因素。尽管近期取得了这些进展,但是壮年劳动力参与率仍然低于20世纪90年代的水平,可能还有更多的空间。如果是这样,那么潜在产出可能高于许多目前的估计。

注:关于美国的壮年劳动力参与情况,可以参考《火热的经济是否在吸引新工人加入劳动力大军?》

Over the past few years, we have also seen evidence of a pickup in U.S. productivity growth, albeit from the very depressed average pace that prevailed throughout most of the expansion. Indeed, as of the first quarter of this year, productivity in the nonfarm business sector rose 2.4 percent over the previous four quarters, its fastest pace since 2010 when the U.S. economy was coming out of the Great Recession. By contrast, in both the 2001–07 and 1982–90 economic expansions, productivity growth was actually slowing relative to its average pace during those expansions. That said, while identifying inflection points in trend productivity growth in real time is notoriously difficult, a pickup in trend productivity growth relative to the pace that prevailed earlier in the expansion is a possibility that we should not, I believe, dismiss.8

在过去几年中,我们也看到了美国生产率增长回升的证据,尽管大部分扩张的平均速度非常低迷。实际上,截至今年第一季度,非农业部门的生产率比前四个季度增长了2.4%,这是自2010年美国经济走出大衰退以来的最快速度。相比之下,在2001-07和1982-90经济扩张中,生产率增长实际上相对于这些扩张期间的平均速度而言正在放缓。也就是说,虽然确定趋势生产率实时增长的拐点是众所周知的困难,但我们不应忽视趋势生产率增长相对于扩张前期的速度有所提升。

Another structural change relevant for monetary policy is that price inflation appears less responsive to resource slack than it did in the past. That is, the short-run price Phillips curve appears to have flattened, implying a change in the dynamic relationship between inflation and employment.9 A flatter Phillips curve is, in a sense, a proverbial double-edged sword. It permits the Federal Reserve to support employment more aggressively during downturns—as was the case during and after the Great Recession—because a sustained inflation breakout is less likely when the Phillips curve is flatter.10 However, a flatter Phillips curve also increases the cost, in terms of economic output, of reversing unwelcome increases in longer-run inflation expectations. Thus, a flatter Phillips curve makes it all the more important that longer-run inflation expectations remain anchored at levels consistent with our 2 percent inflation objective.11

与货币政策相关的另一个结构性变化是,与过去相比,价格通胀似乎对资源松弛的反应较小。也就是说,短期价格菲利普斯曲线似乎已经趋于平缓,这意味着通货膨胀与就业之间的动态关系发生了变化。在某种意义上,更平坦的菲利普斯曲线是一把众所周知的双刃剑。它允许美联储在经济衰退期间更积极地支持就业 - 正如大衰退期间和之后的情况一样 - 因为当菲利普斯曲线更平坦时,持续的通胀上行不太可能。但是,更平坦的菲利普斯曲线也增加了扭转长期通胀预期的成本。因此,更加平坦的菲利普斯曲线使得长期通胀预期保持在与我们2%的通胀目标一致的水平变得更加重要。

Textbook macroeconomics teaches us that understanding the economy and getting monetary policy right requires that we do our best to understand if—and if so, how—the forces of aggregate demand and supply are evolving relative to historical experience and the predictions of our models. While predicting the future is difficult, with available data it appears that in 2018 and in the first quarter of 2019, the supply side of the economy—employment, participation, and productivity—expanded faster than most forecasters outside and inside the Fed expected. Notwithstanding robust growth in demand over these five quarters, PCE price inflation fell somewhat short of the Fed's 2 percent objective. With this background, let me now turn to the outlook for U.S. monetary policy.

教科书告诉我们,理解经济和获得正确的货币政策要求我们尽力了解总体需求和供给的力量如何相对于历史经验和模型的预测而发展。虽然预测未来很困难,但现有数据显示,2018年和2019年第一季度,经济的供应方面(就业、参与和生产率)的扩张速度超过了美联储内部和大多数预测者的预期。尽管五个季度需求强劲增长,但PCE价格通胀略低于美联储2%的目标。在此背景下,现在让我谈谈美国货币政策的前景。

Monetary Policy

货币政策

As I mentioned earlier, my colleagues and I on the FOMC understand that our priority today is to put in place policies that will help sustain maximum employment and price stability in an economy that appears to be operating close to both of our dual-mandate objectives. In our most recent statements, we have indicated that "the Committee will be patient as it determines what future adjustments to the...federal funds rate may be appropriate to support" our dual-mandate objectives.12 What does this mean in practice? To me, it means that we should allow the data on the U.S. economy to flow in and inform our future decisions.

正如我早些时候提到的,我和FOMC的同事们明白,我们今天的首要任务是制定政策,帮助维持与双重任务目标接近的最大就业和价格稳定。在我们最近的陈述中,我们已经指出“在决定未来(适合支持双重任务目标的)联邦基金利率的调整时,委员会将耐心等待”,这在实践中意味着什么?对我来说,这意味着我们应该允许美国经济数据流入并告知我们未来的决策。

I believe that the path for the federal funds rate should be data dependent in two distinct ways.13 Monetary policy should be data dependent in the sense that incoming data reveal at any point in time where the economy is relative to the ultimate objectives of price stability and maximum employment. This information on where the economy is relative to the goals of monetary policy is an important input into interest rate feedback rules. Data dependence in this sense is well understood, as it is of the type implied by a large family of policy rules, including Taylor-type rules, in which the parameters of the economy needed to formulate such rules are taken as known.

我认为联邦基金利率的路径应该是以两种不同的方式依赖数据。货币政策应该依赖于数据,因为即将公布的数据显示经济相对于价格稳定和最大就业的最终目标的位置。有关经济相对于货币政策目标的信息是利率反馈规则的重要输入。在这种意义上的数据依赖性是很好理解的,因为它是一大类政策规则所暗示的类型,包括泰勒式规则,其中制定这些规则所需的经济参数被认为是已知的。

注:关于数据依赖性,可以参考《纽约联储主席:什么是数据依赖性?》《什么是美联储的数据依赖性》

But, of course, key parameters needed to formulate such rules, including u* and r*, are unknown. As a result, in the real world, monetary policy should be—and in the United States, I believe, is—data dependent in a second sense: Policymakers should and do study incoming data and use models to extract signals that enable them to update and improve estimates of r* and u*. Consistent with my earlier discussion, in the Summary of Economic Projections, FOMC participants have, over the past seven years, repeatedly revised down their estimates of both u* and r* as unemployment fell and real interest rates remained well below previous estimates of neutral without the rise in inflation those earlier estimates would have predicted. And these revisions to u* and r* appeared to have had an important influence on the path for the policy rate actually implemented in recent years.

但是,当然,制定这些规则所需的关键参数,包括u*和r*,是未知的。因此,在现实世界中,货币政策应该是在第二种意义上数据依赖的:政策制定者应该并且确实研究即将公布的数据并使用模型提取信号,使他们能够更新并改进对r*和u*的估计。与我之前的讨论一致,在经济预测摘要中,FOMC参与者在过去七年中一再下调他们对u*和r*的估计,因为失业率下降且实际利率仍远低于之前的中性预测。这些对u*和r*的修正似乎对近年来实际实施的政策利率的路径产生了重要影响。

In addition to u* and r*, another important input into any monetary policy assessment is the state of inflation expectations. Indeed, I believe price stability requires that not only actual inflation be centered at our 2 percent objective, but also that expected inflation be equal to our 2 percent inflation objective. Unlike realized inflation, inflation expectations themselves are not directly observable; they must be inferred from econometric models, market prices, and surveys of households and firms. As I assess the totality of the evidence, I judge that, at present, indicators suggest that longer-term inflation expectations sit at the low end of a range that I consider consistent with our price-stability mandate.

除了u*和r*之外,任何货币政策评估的另一个重要输入是通胀预期状态。实际上,我认为价格稳定性要求不仅实际通货膨胀以我们2%的目标为中心,而且预期通货膨胀也等于2%的通胀目标。与实现的通货膨胀不同,通胀预期本身并不能直接观察到;它们必须从计量经济模型,市场价格以及家庭和企业调查中推断出来。当我评估证据的总体时,我判断,目前,指标表明长期通胀预期处于与价格稳定任务一致的范围的下沿。

Where does this leave us today? As I already noted, the U.S. economy is in a very good place, with the unemployment rate near a 50-year low, inflationary pressures muted, expected inflation stable, and GDP growth solid and projected to remain so. Moreover, the federal funds rate is now in the range of estimates of its longer-run neutral level, and the unemployment rate is not far below many estimates of u*. Plugging these inputs into a 1993 Taylor-type rule produces a federal funds rate between 2.25 and 2.5 percent, which is the range for the policy rate that the FOMC has reaffirmed since our January meeting. Most recently, the Committee judged at our May meeting that the current stance of policy remains appropriate, and that decision reflects our view that some of the softness in recent inflation data will prove to be transitory. This judgment aligns with some private-sector forecasts, which now project PCE inflation to return to 2 percent by 2020. However, if the incoming data were to show a persistent shortfall in inflation below our 2 percent objective or were it to indicate that global economic and financial developments present a material downside risk to our baseline outlook, then these are developments that the Committee would take into account in assessing the appropriate stance for monetary policy.

今天意味着什么?正如我已经指出的那样,美国经济处于一个非常好的状态,失业率接近50年来的低点,通胀压力减弱,预期通胀稳定,GDP增长稳固并且预计仍将如此。此外,联邦基金利率目前处于其长期中性水平的估计范围内,失业率并不比许多u*的估计值低太多。将这些输入纳入1993年泰勒式规则,联邦基金利率在2.25%至2.5%之间,这是自1月份会议以来FOMC重申的政策利率范围。最近,委员会在5月会议上判断,目前的政策立场仍然合适,这一决定反映了我们的观点,即近期通胀数据的一些疲软将被证明是暂时的。这一判断符合一些私人部门的预测,即到2020年PCE通胀率将恢复到2%。然而,如果即将公布的数据表明通货膨胀持续低于2%的目标,或者表明全球经济和金融发展对基准前景构成重大下行风险,这些发展将是委员会在评估货币政策的适当立场时会考虑的。

Monetary Policy Implementation and Balance Sheet​ Decisions

货币政策执行和资产负债表决定

Since the beginning of the year, the FOMC has made several important decisions about how it will implement monetary policy and how it will conclude the process of normalizing the size of its balance sheet. These decisions have been made over several meetings and have been part of an ongoing process of the Committee's deliberations. Please allow me to summarize them now.

自今年年初以来,FOMC就如何实施货币政策以及如何完成资产负债表规模正常化进程做出了几项重要决定。这些决定是在几次会议上作出的,并且是委员会审议工作的一部分。请允许我现在总结一下。

The FOMC decided at its January meeting to continue to implement monetary policy in a regime with an ample supply of reserves—a regime often referred to as a floor system.14 Such a system, which has been in place since late 2008, does not require the active management of reserves through daily open market operations. Instead, with an ample level of reserves in the banking system, the effective federal funds rate will settle at or slightly above the rate of interest paid on excess reserves (IOER).15 This system has proven to be an efficient means of controlling the policy rate and effectively transmitting the stance of policy to a wide array of other money market instruments and to broader financial conditions. The FOMC continues to view the target range for the federal funds rate as its primary means of adjusting and communicating the stance of monetary policy, although in doing so, we must and do take into account how our balance sheet size, composition, and trajectory impact broader financial conditions. And as we stated in January, although adjustments in the target range for the federal funds rate are our primary tool for adjusting the stance of monetary policy, we are prepared to adjust the details of the plans for balance sheet normalization based on economic and financial developments.

联邦公开市场委员会在其1月会议上决定继续在拥有充足准备金的制度中实施货币政策 - 这种制度通常被称为下限体系。这种制度自2008年底开始实施,不需要通过日常公开市场操作主动管理准备金。相反,如果银行系统有足够的准备金水平,有效的联邦基金利率将会达到或略高于超额准备金的利率(IOER)。该体系已被证明是控制政策利率的有效手段,并且有效地将政策立场转移到各种其他货币市场工具和更广泛的金融状况。FOMC继续将联邦基金利率的目标范围视为调整和传达货币政策立场的主要手段,尽管我们必须并且确实考虑到资产负债表的规模,构成和轨迹如何影响更广泛的金融状况。正如1月所述,尽管调整联邦基金利率的目标范围是我们调整货币政策立场的主要工具,但我们准备根据经济和金融发展调整资产负债表正常化计划的细节。

At its March meeting, the Committee announced that it would slow the pace of the runoff of the securities holdings in its SOMA portfolio, and that it plans to cease balance sheet runoff entirely by September.16 Since starting the process of balance sheet normalization in 2017, the Federal Reserve's securities portfolio has shrunk by about $500 billion (roughly 2-1/2 percent of GDP) and the level of reserve balances has declined about $700 billion. Consistent with our decision in March, we began to slow the pace of runoff of our balance sheet earlier this month. When the process of normalizing the size of our balance sheet concludes in September, we expect that our reserves liabilities will, for a time, likely remain somewhat above the level necessary for an efficient and effective implementation of monetary policy. If so, we plan after September to hold the size of our securities holdings constant for a while. During this period, reserve balances will continue to decline gradually as currency and other nonreserve liabilities increase. At the point that the Committee judges that reserve balances have declined to the level consistent with the efficient and effective implementation of monetary policy, we plan to resume periodic open market operations to accommodate the normal trend growth in the demand for our liabilities.17

在3月份的会议上,委员会宣布将减缓其SOMA投资组合中证券持有量的减少速度,并计划在9月份完全停止资产负债表轮出。自2017年资产负债表正常化开始以来,美联储的证券投资组合缩减了大约5000亿美元(约占GDP的2.5%),准备金余额减少了大约7000亿美元。与我们3月份的决定一致,本月早些时候我们开始放慢资产负债表的轮出速度。当资产负债表规模正常化的过程于9月结束时,我们预计准备金负债在一段时间内可能会略高于有效实施货币政策所需的水平。我们计划在9月之后将证券持有的规模保持一段时间。在此期间,随着货币和其他非准备金负债的增加,准备金余额将继续逐步下降。在委员会判断准备金金余额已降至与有效实施货币政策相一致的水平时,我们计划恢复定期公开市场操作,以适应我们负债需求的正常趋势增长。

​ As balance sheet normalization has progressed, the effective federal funds rate has firmed relative to the IOER rate. Last year, after the federal funds rate moved up closer to the top of the target range set by the FOMC, we made technical adjustments in our operations by lowering the IOER rate relative to the top of the target range by 5 basis points in June and then again in December to keep the federal funds rate well within its target range. At our May FOMC meeting, we made another technical adjustment in the IOER rate, reducing it by another 5 basis points to 2.35 percent. Since then, the effective federal funds rate has been trading close to the level where it began the year.

随着资产负债表正常化的进展,有效的联邦基金利率相对于IOER利率已经稳固。去年,在联邦基金利率接近FOMC设定的目标区间的上沿之后,我们对运营进行了技术调整,在6月将IOER相对于目标范围上沿降低了5个基点。然后在12月再次将联邦基金利率保持在目标范围内。在今年5月FOMC会议上,我们对IOER进行了另一次技术调整,将其再降低5个基点至2.35%。从那时起,有效的联邦基金利率一直接近年初的水平。

Review of Monetary Policy Strategy, Tools, and Communications

审查货币政策策略、工具和通讯

Before I conclude my prepared remarks, allow me to say a few words about our review of our monetary policy strategy, tools, and communication practices.18 While we believe that our existing approach to conducting monetary policy has served the public well, the purpose of this review is to evaluate and assess possible refinements that might help us best achieve our dual-mandate objectives on a sustained basis.

在结束我准备好的发言之前,请允许我谈谈我们对货币政策策略、工具和沟通实践的审查。虽然我们认为我们现行的货币政策方法对公众有利,但目的是本次审查旨在评估和评估可能有助于我们持续实现双重任务目标的可能改进。

With the U.S. economy operating at or close to our maximum-employment and price-stability goals, now is an especially opportune time to conduct this review. We want to ensure that we are well positioned to continue to meet our statutory goals in coming years. Furthermore, the shifts in r* and u*, as well as the flattening of the Phillips curve that I discussed earlier, suggest that the U.S. and foreign economies have evolved in significant ways relative to the pre-crisis experience.

随着美国经济达到或接近我们的最大就业和价格稳定目标,现在是进行此次审查的一个特别合适的时机。我们希望确保我们能够在未来几年继续满足我们的法定目标。此外,我在前面讨论过的r*和u*的变化以及菲利普斯曲线的扁平化表明美国和外国经济相对于危机前的经历已经发生了重大变化。

The Federal Reserve System is currently conducting "town hall"-style Fed Listens events, in which we are hearing from a broad range of interested individuals and groups, including business and labor leaders, community development advocates, and academics. In addition, we are holding a System research conference next week at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago that will feature speakers and panelists from outside the Fed. Building on both the perspectives we hear and staff analysis, the FOMC will conduct its own assessment of its monetary policy framework, beginning around the middle of the year. We will share our conclusions with the public in the first half of 2020.

美联储目前正在进行“市政厅”式的活动,广泛听取有关个人和团体的意见,包括商业和劳工领袖,社区发展倡导者和学者。此外,我们下周将在芝加哥联储举行一次系统研究会议,该会议将邀请美联储以外的发言人和小组成员参加。在我们听到的观点和员工分析的基础上,FOMC将在年中开始对其货币政策框架进行自己的评估。我们将在2020年上半年与公众分享我们的结论。

The economy is constantly evolving, bringing with it new policy challenges. So it makes sense for us to remain open minded as we assess current practices and consider ideas that could potentially enhance our ability to deliver on the goals the Congress has assigned us. For this reason, my colleagues and I do not want to prejudge or predict our ultimate findings. What I can say is that any refinements or more-material changes to our framework that we might make will be aimed solely at enhancing our ability to achieve and sustain our dual-mandate objectives of maximum employment and stable prices.

经济不断发展,带来了新的政策挑战。因此,当我们评估当前的实践并考虑可能会增强我们实现国会赋予我们目标的能力的想法时,我们保持开放的态度是有道理的。出于这个原因,我和我的同事不想预先判断或预测我们的最终结果。我可以说的是,我们可能对我们的框架进行的任何改进或更实质性的改变将仅旨在提高我们实现和维持最大就业和稳定价格的双重任务目标的能力。

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